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A bstract
This thesis contains four studies of generally unobservable skills and preferences 
of relevance to economic behaviour.
The first chapter examines the validity of the assumption of equal latent ability 
among monozygotic twins. An influential literature has employed the schooling 
decisions of twins to estimate returns to schooling. Using a unique dataset includ­
ing IQ test scores, income and two measures of schooling for 1780 monozygotic 
twins, within-pair differences in measured IQ are found to be a significant predic­
tor of both income and schooling differences.
In the second chapter, the effect of general cognitive ability on proposer and 
responder behaviour in the ultimatum game is examined, using a large and repre­
sentative sample of 895 individuals. No effects are found on proposer behaviour, 
and only small, but statistically significant, effects are found on responder behav­
iour.
In the third chapter, a sample of almost 30,000 mono- and dizygotic twins 
is used to study the heritability of financial risk-taking. Investment decisions 
made by virtually all Swedish adults regarding mandatory pension savings are 
taken as a field experiment to infer risk preferences. Standard techniques from
behaviour genetics are used to partition variation in risk-taking into environmental 
and genetic components. The results suggest that genetic variation is an important 
source of individual heterogeneity in financial risk-taking and that the frequently 
reported parent-child associations in attitudes toward risk are, at least in part, 
genetically mediated.
In the fourth and final chapter, the robustness of recent results indicating a 
large role for genes in determining variation in the propensity for self-employment 
is examined empirically using a novel dataset, and a large but imprecisely esti­
mated difference between women and men is found.
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Introduction
Skills and preferences
This thesis examines certain generally unobservable skills and preferences: how 
they interrelate with commonly observed economic outcomes and with each other, 
and from where they might derive.
In each of the first two chapters, I take IQ as a measure of some underlying 
property of the individual, although the interpretation of IQ differs substantially 
across these two chapters. In chapter one, the property of interest is latent wage- 
earning ability and specifically the component of it which carries any correlation 
with schooling. In other words, ability as in “the ability bias of returns to school­
ing” is under examination. IQ is taken as one possibly relevant measure of this 
underlying skill. However, IQ may also reflect unrelated differences in preferences 
for pursuing higher education, or reflect differences in wage-earning capacity which 
is unrelated to schooling. Two different sets of assumptions regarding the skills 
and preferences composing the IQ measure are proposed, and the parameter of 
interest is tested under each set.
In the second chapter, the main property under analysis is rationality, or the
14
skill of making decisions which maximise the likelihood of attaining one’s objec­
tives, and IQ is taken as a plausible, although imperfect, measurement of this. 
Rationality is proposed as an alternative to social preferences in explaining com­
monly observed behavioural "anomalies’' in a standard experiment, the ultimatum 
bargaining game, and this proposition is then evaluated empirically.
In the last two chapters, the properties under examination are risk preferences 
and propensity for entrepreneurial activity. In these cases, the distinction between 
skills and preferences is not a major turning point of the analysis. Instead, the 
analysis focuses on the origin of these properties, and specifically on the genetic 
basis of observed variation in the sample.
C hapters
The first chapter is a methodological contribution to the literature on estimat­
ing the returns to schooling. An influential literature has employed the schooling 
decisions of monozygotic twins to mitigate problems of unobserved ability. If abil­
ity is equal within twin pairs, then the within-pair estimator identifies returns to 
schooling in spite of heterogeneous ability in the population. In the first chap­
ter, an empirical assessment of the equal abilities assumption is provided using a 
unique dataset including IQ test scores, income, and two measures of schooling 
for 1780 monozygotic twins. Within-pair differences in measured IQ are found to 
be a significant predictor of income and schooling differences, and inclusion of IQ 
in the wage equation is shown to considerably reduce the estimated within-pair 
effect of schooling on income. These findings cast doubts on the validity of using
15
the co-twin methodology when estimating returns to schooling and challenge the 
usefulness of the empirical results derived from this literature.
In the second chapter, I examine the effect of IQ on proposer and responder 
behaviour in the ultimatum game, using a large and representative sample of 895 
individuals. I find no effects on proposer behaviour and statistically significant, 
but small, effects on responder behaviour. These findings remain when controlling 
for a range of demographic variables, and when juxtaposing individuals from the 
top 5% of the population IQ distribution, and the rest of the sample. Further­
more, the 2% of subjects who played the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the 
standard ultimatum game model did not differ significantly on neither IQ nor any 
of the demographic variables examined.
The third chapter reports results from a study of the heritability of financial 
risk-taking. This chapter was coauthored with David Cesarini (MIT), Magnus 
Johannesson (Stockholm School of Economics), and Bjorn Wallace (Stockholm 
School of Economics), my share being approximately 35%, apportioned evenly 
across all parts of the work. This study is based on a sample of almost 30,000 
mono- and dizygotic twins. Following a major pension reform in the fall of the year 
2000, virtually all Swedish adults had to simultaneously make a financial decision 
affecting post-retirement wealth. We take this event, known as the Big Bang of 
the Swedish financial sector, as a field experiment to infer risk preferences. We 
then apply standard techniques from behaviour genetics to partition variation in 
risk-taking into environmental and genetic components. Our findings suggest that 
genetic variation is an important source of individual heterogeneity in financial
16
risk-taking and that the frequently reported parent-child associations in attitudes 
toward risk are, at least in part, genetically mediated.
Finally, in the fourth chapter, the heritability of entrepreneurship is examined. 
Recent results from a sample of female twins indicate a large role for genes in 
determining variation in the propensity for self-employment. Using a twice as 
large Swedish sample of twins, almost 4000 pairs in total, of which more than 
one third are men, I estimate heritability in self-employment for men and women 
separately. I am able to replicate previous results for women, but for men I find 
low or no heritability. Instead, my estimates suggest that common environment 
is a much more important source of variation in entrepreneurship for men.
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Chapter 1 
The co-twin m ethodology and 
returns to  schooling - an 
empirical critique
1.1 Introduction
There is a widely shared view that estimates of the marginal returns to schooling 
will be biased unless proper account is taken of heterogeneities in latent ability. 
If the propensity to invest in further years of education is also directly related in 
a positive way to the ability to earn wages, then this will cause an upward bias 
in estimates of the effect of an additional year of schooling on wages (see e.g. 
Card (1999)). A number of approaches to removing this endogeneity have been 
proposed. One influential strand of the literature has exploited within-family vari­
ation in general, and variation within monozygotic (MZ) twin pairs in particular,
18
to control for unobserved ability. Under the identifying assumption that ability is 
common among siblings of the type at hand, this allows for consistent estimates, 
as long as problems of measurement errors in the schooling variable can be dealt 
with adequately. Especially with regards to MZ twins, the attraction of the equal 
ability assumption is easy to understand. MZ twins are the result of a fertil­
ized egg splitting in two shortly after conception, resulting (after about 38 weeks) 
in two genetically identical individuals. Furthermore, MZ twins (or ’’identical” 
twins, as they are often referred to) are typically raised by the same parents, go 
to the same school, and are influenced by the same peer groups when growing up.
The idea that the latent wage earning ability of two individuals in such a pair 
would be virtually identical is not hard to accept, a priori. However, identical abil­
ity begs the question of what causes observed within-pair differences in schooling, 
as standard optimising models predict that two identically able individuals would 
choose the same level of schooling (as in e.g. Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998)). Any 
observed variation in schooling must then be explained by ’’optimising errors” , or 
differences in preferences for schooling which do not affect wage earning ability. 
Hence, it is assumed that differences in schooling across the population are caused 
by ability differences, but that this is not true within twin pairs.
A further potential problem with the co-twin methodology was demonstrated 
by Griliches (1979); Although twins may have very similar levels of ability, the 
observed similarities in years of schooling and income are also large. Therefore, 
even though within-pair differences are purged from most of the heterogeneities 
in ability, they also lack most of the useful variation in schooling and income.
19
Griliches (1979) noted that when the degree of twin similarity is the same for 
ability and for schooling, first-differencing contributes nothing in terms of remov­
ing ability bias. This critique has been further developed by Bound and Solon 
(1999), who also point out that a priori the relationship between the degrees of 
similarity in ability and schooling, respectively, is not clear.
Finally, whereas the two above lines of critiques question the benefit from 
using twins data, the potentially most serious concern raised relates to measure­
ment error in schooling and whether it can properly be instrumented for. As was 
acknowledged by one of the first authors to apply this methodology (Taubman 
(1976)), differencing within pairs reduces the amount of true variation without 
reducing measurement error to the same extent, and hence serves to amplify the 
effects of mismeasurements in schooling. Furthermore, even with valid instru­
ments for number of years spent in an educational facility, this quantity may not 
perfectly reflect true education, a distinction pointed out at least as early as in 
Griliches (1977). Studies of such heterogeneities in the production function for hu­
man capital abound, see e.g. Sacerdote (2001), on peer group effects and Rivkin 
et al. (2005) on teacher quality. As the data of this study present limited op­
portunity to examine the issue of mismeasured schooling, the twin methodology 
will be given the benefit of the doubt; The assumption of perfectly instrumented 
schooling will be maintained, and focus directed towards the source of the alleged 
benefits from using twins data - the equal or virtually equal ability within twin 
pairs.
To address the question of ability differences, official registry data on income
20
and schooling is combined with self-reported data on schooling from two surveys 
aimed at all Swedish twins born 1950-1975. Uniquely, this dataset is then linked to 
IQ test scores from compulsory military conscription, performed before or around 
the end of secondary school. Using this dataset, the usefulness of the assumption of 
equal ability within pairs is investigated. It is found that within-pair differences in 
IQ are significantly associated with income even when accounting for differences in 
schooling, that within-pair differences in IQ have a statistically and economically 
significant effect on within-pair differences in schooling, and that inclusion of IQ 
reduces within-pair estimates of returns to schooling by about 15% across various 
specifications and variable definitions. These results cast doubts on the co-twin 
approach to estimating the returns to schooling.
The structure of this chapters is as follows: In the next section, empirical 
findings from the co-twin literature on estimating the returns to schooling are 
reviewed briefly. After this, in Section 1.3, an empirical framework for examining 
the equal abilities assumption is outlined. Section 1.4 contains a presentation of 
the data, followed by results from the main analysis in Section 1.5, and robustness 
checks in Section 1.6. The consistency of the data with two additional restrictions 
is considered and rejected in Section 1.7. A discussion of the main findings is 
provided in Section 1.8, after which Section 1.9 concludes.
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1.2 Previous co-twin studies of the returns to  
schooling
Jere Behrman and Paul Taubman (Behrman and Taubman (1976), Taubman 
(1976)) pioneered the use of data on twins for studying the returns to school­
ing. Examining within-pair differences in annual earnings and schooling among 
male twin veterans in the NAS-NRC dataset, Taubman (1976) found evidence 
of substantial upward ability bias in traditional cross-sectional estimates of the 
returns to schooling. Taubman’s (1976) estimates decreased from 8 .8 % to 4.8% 
when moving from regression on the cross-section to within-pair estimation, de­
spite correcting for an assumed 1 0% measurement error in the schooling data. 
The results in Behrman and Taubman (1976) imply similarly that standard OLS 
estimates are considerably upward biased.
The co-twin approach experienced a revival in the 1990’s, following the innova­
tion by Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) to collect data on both own schooling and 
co-twin’s schooling from each individual in the sample. Having two measures of 
schooling, they then use the first-difference of schooling reported by one member 
of a pair as an instrument for the first-difference reported by the other member. 
If measurement errors are uncorrelated, this allows for a correction of the problem 
of measurement error in the schooling variable. Under the crucial assumption of 
equal abilities within pairs, their approach thus provides a consistent estimate of 
the returns from schooling.
Ashenfelter and Krueger’s (1994) within-pair IV estimates were, surprisingly
22
enough, considerably higher than standard least squares estimates on the cross- 
section. However, later studies strongly suggest that these initial results were 
due to an anomalous sample, as analyses of extensions of this sample produced 
within-pair IV estimates that were not higher than conventional cross-sectional 
estimates (Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998), Rouse (1999)). These later findings are 
consistent with most other co-twin studies (Miller et al (1995), Isacsson (1999), 
Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999), Bonjour et al (2003)), who likewise find only 
a small upwards ability bias.1
Two recent additions to the co-twin literature are Isacsson (2004) and Zhang 
et al (2007). Isacsson (2004) has the benefit of working with a representative 
dataset comprising education and income data for a very large number of Swedish 
monozygotic twins born 1926-1958, 2609 pairs in total, and is therefore able to 
provide precise estimates of non-linearities in returns to schooling, and to allow 
for non-classical errors in the measurements of schooling. Zhang et al (2007) 
analyse a dataset of 914 pairs of Chinese monozygotic twins and find that the 
returns to schooling during the Cultural Revolution (defined as 1966-1976 in their 
study) was roughly the same as that of later cohorts. In both these studies, the 
implied ability bias in cross-sectional estimates is positive.
1 For two older summaries of the literature on returns to schooling using twins data, see Card 
(1999) and Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999).
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1.3 Empirical framework
1.3.1 A n augm ented  co-tw in  m odel
Consider the following simple model of wage determination, drawing on e.g. Card 
(1999):
yij — Oy "I- (3Sij "I- 'yAij -I- Uij (1.1)
Where , Sij and are income in natural logarithms, years of schooling, 
and ability, respectively, for individual i of twin pair j, and where the ordering of 
both individuals and pairs is random. Returns to schooling, j3: and partial returns 
to ability, 7 , are assumed to be equal across individuals. Let latent ability, A, be 
defined widely enough to allow S  and u to be independent, and be measured 
in standard deviations about the population mean. Finally, ay varies with a 
quadratic in the age of the individual, to capture experience and cohort-specific 
effects. Furthermore, assume the following causal model of schooling:
=  as +  5 Aij +  €ij (1-2)
Where e is a summary measure of all determinants of schooling which are 
exogenous to the unobservables of the wage equation. Extend this exogeneity to 
apply across twins within a pair, so that Corr(Aij, e^) =  0 and Corr(uij,ekj) = 0 , 
V z, j . Specify the sign of ability such that 8 > 0. To capture cohort-specific effects, 
the intercept again varies with a quadratic function of age.
Let the ability of a twin be statistically related to the ability of his co-twin in
24
the following manner:
A\j = <J)A2j +  Ql\j (1*3)
Here, 0 is the correlation between the abilities each twin and his co-twin, and 
aij  is uncorrelated with A2j by construction. Equivalently, 0 is the share of vari­
ance in ability explained by a variance factor common to both twins. Furthermore, 
assume that differences in ability within pairs are independent of all other errors 
(u, e, and r  (below))
The main identifying assumption of the literature on estimating the returns 
to schooling using variation within twin pairs, is that twins have identical latent 
abilities such that A\j =  A2j. In the above framework, this translates to assuming 
0  =  1 , which in turn implies Var(a) =  0 due to the random ordering of twins. 
Under 0 =  1, consistent estimates of P can be obtained by estimating the model 
in first-differences:
^Vj ~  4- ^pjjAAj +  Auj (1-4)
Where Ayj = yij — y2j and similarly for the explanatory variables. Since AAj  
is a zero vector under the standard twin assumption, the within-pair difference in 
income can simply be regressed on the within-pair difference in schooling;
Aj/j = PfdA S j +  Au" (1.5)
This is the basic idea behind all within-pair estimators in the literature. The 
aim of this study is to determine whether 0 =  1 . For this purpose, consider IQ 
measured at around the age of 18, and specify its relationship with ability as
25
follows:
Tij =  7xAij +  Tij (1.6)
Where is independent of Ay. Let be measured in standard deviations 
about the population mean, and assume 7r > 0 .
Finally, let yi refer to own income, as opposed to y2 for co-twin’s income, and 
similarly for S, A, T, u, e, and r , so that (yi)ij = (3/2)*^  I Vi ^  k. When not 
specified, as above, y refers to own income, y\.
1.3.2 Tw o sim ple tests  o f  th e  basic tw in  assum ption
Auxiliary assumptions A
Assume crulTl = aulT2 =  0  
Estimate:
A Vj = PA Sj +  AiA Tj +  Au* (1.7)
Where the error term is:
Au* = - \ i (A T j  -  AAj)  +  Auj  (1.8)
If (f> = 1 , then AAj = 0 and A Tj — A  Tj, and consequently Ai =  0. Fur­
thermore, ft and Ai are consistently estimated since Ai(ATj — AAj)  =  0, and 
hence independent of A Sj and of A Tj. The distribution of Ai is different under 
the null and the alternative hypothesis. It follows that Ai is a valid test statistic
for the null hypothesis that (j) — 1 . Measurement error in schooling can be dealt
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with using an alternative measure of schooling, the approach championed in this 
literature by Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), assuming the necessary correlation 
and exogeneity conditions hold.
Auxiliary assumptions B
Alternatively, assume creiT1 =  cr£lT2 = 0 , and relax the above assumptions on aUlTl 
and aulT2. Let A2 be defined by the following estimating equation:
A Sj = A2A Tj +  AcJ (1.9)
Where, analogously, the error term is:
Ae] -  -A 2(AI} -  AAj)  +  A(j (1.10)
If (f) = 1 , then AAj = 0 and AT) =  A tJ5 and consequently A2 =  0. Further­
more, A2 is consistently estimated since A2(ATj — AAj) = 0, and hence indepen­
dent of A Tj. The distribution of A2 is different under the null and the alternative 
hypothesis. It follows that A2 is a valid test statistic for the null hypothesis that 
(j) = 1 , under this alternative restriction on the error terms.
1.4 D ata
The dataset links information from the Swedish Twin Registry with data from 
Statistics Sweden and Swedish enlistment records. The Swedish twin registry 
contains virtually all twins born in Sweden from 1926 onwards, and is kept mainly
27
for the purpose of performing epidemiological studies (see Lichtenstein (2006) for 
a description of the Swedish twin registry). The survey data used in this chapter 
was collected in 1998-2002 (the SALT survey) from twins born 1950-1958 (the 
first cohort), and in 2005-2006 (the STAGE survey) from twins born in 1959-1975 
(the second cohort). Response rates were 74% and 60%, respectively.
Only data on monozygotic twins (about l/4*h of the sample) is used, where 
zygosity has been determined by the Swedish Twin Registry using a battery of 
questions relating to physical similarity. The validity of this method of deter­
mining zygosity has been repeatedly estimated to be 95-98% (Lichtenstein et al 
(2002)).
The data contains two measures of educational achievement. One is a self- 
reported measure from the survey data collected by the Swedish Twin Registry. 
The other is based on administrative data from 2005. The self-reported data 
consists, for the early cohort, of an indicator of highest attained qualification, 
and for the late cohort, of total years of schooling at the different levels of the 
education system. For the early cohort, years of schooling are assigned based 
on the standard years of schooling associated with the degree in question. The 
administrative data contains highest degree attained. Years of schooling based 
on the survey data are used as the explanatory education variable, with degree 
dummies based on administrative sources as instruments.
Data on income consists of yearly taxable earnings in 2005 as reported by 
employers to the tax authorities. In the main specification, only pairs where 
both twins in a pair had earnings exceeding 70,000 Swedish krona (approximately
28
£5000) are included, in an attempt to capture only individuals working full-time 
so that income more or less corresponds to hourly earnings. The practice of ei­
ther excluding data not corresponding to full-time work or using information on 
hourly wages is followed by practically all previous studies of the returns to school­
ing using twins back to at least Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994)(Ashenfelter and 
Krueger (1994), Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998), Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999), 
Bonjour et al (2003), Isacsson(1999), Isacsson(2004), Miller et al (1995), Rouse 
(1999), Zhang et al (2007)).2 As the data includes IQ measures for individuals 
born starting in 1950, income is measured at the ages 30 through 55, depending 
on birth year.
1.4.1 IQ data
Data on IQ is based on enlistment records. Virtually all Swedish men in the age 
group underwent aptitude testing for compulsory military service at around age 
18, and the dataset of this chapter contains results on the four component tests of 
the intelligence test used by the Enlistment Agency. As the normal school starting 
age in Sweden is seven, the average individual in the main sample would have taken 
the test at least two years prior to finishing education. The older part of the sample 
was tested using Enlistment battery 67 (EB67) which came into use in 1967, and 
the younger part received a similar test, Enlistment battery 80 (EB80). Both tests 
were designed to measure a general ability factor based on spatial intelligence, 
verbal ability, logical reasoning, and technical comprehension. Test scores from
2It can also be noted that due to the logarithmic transformation, some outliers in the full 
dataset are more than 1 0  standard deviations lower than the average.
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earlier versions of the Enlistment battery test (such as EB44 and EB49) had 
been explicitly interpreted as IQ scores, and although this interpretation was 
not formally carried over to the EB67 and EB80, their component tests were 
nevertheless very close to those of a standard IQ test and provide a good measure 
of general intelligence (Carlstedt (2000)). Test scores are normalised by year 
using all observations in the dataset for which there are test scores, and the sum 
across test scores is then used as the raw IQ measure3. This raw measure is then 
normalised against all observations in the dataset, to allow for an approximation 
of population standard deviations to be used as the metric for IQ.
Using IQ test scores which were gathered not in a school environment, but 
under the considerably different conditions of military conscription, reduces the 
risk that the test scores pick up factors related to, e.g., a general affinity with 
school-like tests that yet do not translate into wage earning capacity. Using the 
terminology of the empirical framework outlined above, the risk that creiT1 ^  0  is 
reduced.
1.4.2 R epresentativeness
In Table 1.1, the main sample is compared to the national average with regards 
to income, education, and marital status. Income is slightly higher, although by 
less than one tenth, and education is higher by 0.8 years4. IQ test results are 
slightly higher than the average for the norm group, i.e. all 12366 twins in the
3 Assigning equal weights to each sub-test is in accordance with the standard practice of the 
Swedish Armed Forces.
4This figure differs from Table 1.1 due to rounding.
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relevant cohorts who answered the SALT or STAGE survey and for whom there 
is IQ data, by about l / 8 t/l of a standard deviation.
The total sample size was determined as follows: Out of the 31824 respondents 
to the STAGE and SALT surveys in our cohorts, 3522 were male monozygotic 
twins of which 2753 had data on education from both administrative and survey 
data. Of these, 2353 had non-missing income, and 2288 had an income above 
70000 SEK, the cut-off used to eliminate observations whose income unambigu­
ously did not derive from full-time employment. Among these, 2129 individuals 
had valid IQ test scores from enlistment data5. Finally, 1780 of these observations 
were from complete pairs of twins, i. e. where the co-twin was also in the sample.
To evaluate whether using an income threshold to exclude observations clearly 
not in full-time employment results in a non-representative sample, an extended 
sample was created using the same procedure as for the main sample, but with­
out any income threshold. Probit regressions were then run with the full-time 
proxy as the dependent variable, and various combinations of IQ, education and 
age as independent variables. The results are presented in Table 1.2. Only age 
has a statistically significant (positive) effect, with an average marginal effect of 
0 .0 0 1 , implying that an age increase of ten years corresponds to an increase in the 
probability of being above the threshold of 1% point. The coefficients on IQ and 
education are small and statistically insignificant, regardless of whether included 
together or separately.
5For individuals born in two out of the 26 years of birth in the sample, 1950 and 1960, the 
IQ data contains only about l/10th of the expected number of observations.
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1.4.3 C om parability w ith  previous studies
The main purpose of this study is to generalise not from a sample of twins to a 
population of non-twins, but rather from one sample of twins to other samples of 
twins. Therefore, it is important to know how representative my dataset is of the 
datasets of twins used hitherto. Table 1.3 compares parameters from my dataset 
to parameters reported previously in the literature.
The first two parameters concern similarity between twins. In my data, mea­
sured years of schooling correlate 0.73 between a twin and his co-twin, a figure in 
line with what has been reported in the literature. Furthermore, results on test 
scores correlate 0.82, which again is a standard degree of similarity.
The following two parameters concern the structure of the measurement er­
rors in reported years of schooling. In my sample, the reliability ratio6 is 0.88, 
which is very similar to those reported in previous twin studies. The reliability 
ratio of the within-pair differences is 0.65, which is closer to the lower than to 
the higher estimates reported in Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) and Ashenfelter 
and Rouse (1998). The observed within-pair reliability ratio in my data is also 
close to that expected based on the cross-sectional reliability ratio and the twin 
correlation in schooling, as reported above. If all measurement errors are classical, 
the thus imputed within-pair reliability ratio would be 0.58.7. Note also that the 
cross-sectional reliability ratio of 0 .8 8  implies, under classical errors, a within-pair
6With classical measurement errors, the reliability ratio is the square root of the R2 from a 
regression of measured years of schooling on its instruments. If there is only one instrument, 
this is equivalent to the correlation, as stated in the table.
7The imputed within-pair reliability ratio is (r — Corr(S\, S2 ) ) /( l  — Corr(S\, S2)), where r 
is the reliability ratio based on cross-sectional measures.
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correlation in schooling of 0.82 (0.73/0.88) when correcting for measurement er­
rors. Recall that as shown by Griliches (1979), co-twin estimators are less biased 
than cross-sectional estimators if and only if (f) is greater than the similarity in 
schooling, i.e. in this dataset 0.82.
The final four parameters concern impacts on wages (in logarithms), and as 
such we would expect them to vary depending on institutional factors in the coun­
tries where they are measured. The first is a simple cross-sectional estimate of the 
returns to schooling, when correcting for measurement error in years to school­
ing. My estimates are slightly lower to those found in studies from US and UK, 
but slightly higher than those of Isacsson (1999) using Swedish twins. However, 
Isacsson’s (1999) sample includes both men and women, whereas my estimates 
are for men only. As is clear from the following parameter, my data yields larger 
differences between within-pair estimates and cross-sectional estimates than what 
is commonly found in twin studies. Notice however that the result from Isacs­
son (1999) was constructed using an imputed within-pair measurement error, and 
as such is not strictly comparable to the other figures which apply instrumental 
variables techniques to correct for measurement error.
The final two parameters concern the relationship of IQ with labour market 
outcomes, and are not specifically based on data on twins. The total predictive 
effect of IQ on income (in logarithms) in my data is 0.16, i.e. an increase in IQ of 
one standard deviation corresponds to an increase in income by about 16%. The 
rough estimate reported by Bowles and Gintis (2002) based on a meta-study of 
24 studies on US data is 0.266. This discrepancy corresponds reasonably to dif­
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ferences in income dispersion between US and Sweden, as reported in Gottschalk 
and Smeeding (1997). Finally, measured schooling correlates about 0.51 with 
measured IQ, a figure roughly in line with the average of 0.55 reported by Neisser 
et al (1996) in an authoritative report on the state of intelligence research. It 
should be noted that the latter figure is based on IQ test scores from early years, 
mainly primary school. The fact that the correlation with schooling is lower in 
my data suggests that simultaneity in test scores is not a major concern.
1.5 R esults
1.5.1 Tw o sim ple tests
The partial effect of IQ in the within-pair wage equation (Auxiliary 
assumptions A)
Columns 1-2 of Table 1.4presents results from within-pair regressions of income on 
schooling. The coefficient on IQ in the second column demonstrates that within- 
pair differences in IQ have a direct effect on income differences, and that this effect 
is statistically significant and large. The magnitude of the coefficient implies that 
a twin with an IQ one population standard deviation higher than his co-twin, has 
an income which is on average 7.4% higher than his co-twin, when controlling for 
schooling. The coefficient on schooling drops from 3.4% to 2.9%, or about l /7 t/l.8 
If we believe the restrictions underpinning this test (aUlT1 = aUlT2 = 0), we must
8 It should be noted that since Tij is an imperfect measure of ability, the estimated returns 
to schooling are biased and inconsistent when (f> ^  1 , i.e. when the equal ability assumption is 
violated.
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reject <f> = 1 .
The impact of IQ in the within-pair schooling equation (Auxiliary as­
sumptions B)
Column 3 of Table 1.4 contains the results from the second simple test of <fi = 1 , 
based instead on <reiri =  cr£1T2 =  0. The estimated within-pair effect of IQ is 
statistically significant and large, with a difference of one population standard 
deviation corresponding to a difference of 0.52 years of schooling9. Under these 
alternative test assumptions as well, <f> = 1 is rejected.
Conclusion
If <j> = 1, the data is only consistent with the model if differences within twin 
pairs in the errors in test scores, A t, are related both to Ae and to Au. In 
other words, under the standard twin assumption of equal ability, differences in 
test scores, AT,  must be correlated both with Ae (unobservable preferences for 
schooling which are not directly related to wage earning capacity), and with Au  
(unobservable capacity to earn wages which is not related to schooling), yet be 
uncorrelated with A  A (actual unobservable ability).
1.6 Robustness checks
There are a number of legitimate concerns which may be raised with regards to 
the above findings. In this section, four such issues are presented briefly in turn,
9This can be compared with the sample standard deviation of schooling of 2.6 years.
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along with some efforts taken to examine the sensitivity of the above findings 
with regards to these issues. This is followed by a summary of the results of these 
robustness checks.
1.6.1 M isclassification
Some of the twins in the sample may have been misclassified as monozygotic 
twins despite being in fact dizygotic twins. If ability differences are for some rea­
son relatively less familial (i.e., compared to the family share of variance of the 
exogenous determinant of schooling) in dizygotic twins, this will cause the above 
findings to be overstated. To examine this issue, the 5% of pairs which were the 
most dissimilar with respect to IQ were dropped and the main equations were 
re-estimated. This is a conservative test in that no more than 2-5% of monozy­
gotic twins are normally misclassified as dizygotic using the type of classification 
algorithm employed by the Swedish Twin Registry (Lichtenstein et al (2002)). 
It should also be noted that all twin studies referred to in the literature review 
above have employed similar classification algorithms as does the Swedish Twin 
Registry.
1.6.2 IQ construction
To examine the sensitivity of my findings to variations in the construction of the 
aggregate test score, a so called factor ”<7”, i.e. the first principal component, 
was calculated from the four subtests of the military IQ test. This measure was 
standardised by year against all twins for whom there was data on IQ, and used
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as an alternative measure of IQ.
1.6.3 C hoice o f instrum ent
As a further robustness check, the roles of instrument and regressor were reversed 
for the two sources of schooling data. As the administrative data, which were used 
as instruments in the main analysis, consist of dummy variables for highest degree 
attained, they were converted into years of schooling using population averages 
estimated by Isacsson (2004)10.
1.6.4 Full-tim e threshold
Finally, the sensitivity of the main results to variations in the threshold on yearly 
earnings was examined, by applying alternative thresholds of 40,000 and 180,000 
Swedish krona (about £3500 and £15000, respectively). Regarding the lower 
threshold, it should be noted that it corresponds to a full-time hourly wage of 
about £1.50, i.e. impossibly low in the context of the industrialised world. Fur­
thermore, because of the logarithmic conversion of wages, the 18 observations 
below the lower threshold are between 4 and 10 standard deviations away from 
the mean (in a sample of around 2000). The lower threshold is indeed very low 
for the purposes of approximating a full-time proxy.
10Isacsson (2004) examined a representative sample with high quality data on years of school­
ing and regressed this on the same type of administrative data that are used in this paper.
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1.6.5 R esu lts
Table 1.5 presents results from the two simple tests of the equal ability assumption, 
under the above five alternative samples and variable specifications. In all cases, 
the coefficient on IQ, T^, is statistically and economically significant in both the 
wage equation (Column 2 of estimated coefficients) and the schooling equation 
(Column 3 of estimated coefficients). Exclusion of the 5% of pairs where twins are 
the most dissimilar with respect to IQ is the modification which affects the results 
the most, yielding the highest estimated effect of IQ on income (0.100), and the 
lowest estimated effect of IQ on schooling (0.322). However, neither of these results 
is far from the other four robustness outcomes or the main results. Excluding the 
5% most dissimilar pairs also has as its effect that the coefficient on schooling in the 
wage equation, when including IQ, becomes borderline statistically insignificant 
although its magnitude remains in line with the other cases.
1.7 Evaluating som e additional m odel restric­
tions
This section expands on the previous analysis by considering whether there are 
additional restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix of the errors which are 
consistent with the data but which have not been imposed thus far.
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1.7.1 Is IQ a (nearly) perfect m easure o f ability?
The precision with which the test score, T, proxies for ability, A, can be crudely 
evaluated by considering whether the variance of r  is zero:
a 2r =  0 (1.11)
A simple way of testing this is to consider the best linear within-pair predictor 
of schooling using test scores, as presented in Table 1.411:
ASj =  A3ATj +  Ae* (1.12)
Where, by construction, E(ATj,Ae*j) =  0.
If of =  0, then A3 =  8, and an efficient estimator of A3 is given by the best 
cross-sectional predictor of schooling:
Sij =  a s  + A4 +  e*j (1-13)
Hence, if of =  0, then A3 =  A4 , where A4 is efficient. Under the alternative
hypothesis that of ^  0 , only A3 is consistent. Applying random effects GLS,
A4 =  1.24 (0.06) (standard error within parenthesis) to be compared to A3 which 
is 0.52 (0.11)12.The null hypothesis of of =  0 can be rejected at the 0.1% level
1 1 Note that although their estimating equations are identical, A3  is not in general equal to A2 , 
since the maintained assumptions on the errors when defining A2  are more strict. A3 , being only 
a linear predictor, is unbiased and consistent regardless of the assumptions on the error terms.
1 2 This is numerically identical to A2  as reported in Table 1.3 although the interpretations are 
different.
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using a standard Hausman (1978) test.
1.7.2 Is schooling as fam ilial as ability?
As pointed out earlier, Griliches (1979) established that if the proportion of the 
variance in ability which is explained by a common family component is identical 
to the degree of within-pair similarity in the non-ability determinants of schooling 
(e), then the within-pair estimator of returns to schooling is equally biased as 
the cross-sectional estimator. In the above presented framework, this condition 
amounts to the restriction that:
(f) = Corr{e u e2) (1.14)
In analogy with the previous section, consider the best linear within-pair pre­
dictor of income using schooling:
Ay,- = X5ASj  +  Au* (1.15)
Where, by construction, E(ASj, Au*).
If <j) — <reie2, then A5 =  (/? +  7 r), where r is the coefficient on schooling when
regressing ability on schooling and a quadratic in age. In other words, as an
indicator of /?, A5 is equally biased as the standard cross-sectional OLS estimator 
of income on schooling in the cross-section. Consequently, an efficient estimator
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of A5 is given by the best cross-sectional predictor of income:
Vij "f" ^6^ij "t" U — (1.16)
Hence, if (p = <Jei£2, then A5 = A6, where A6 is efficient. Under the alternative 
hypothesis that (f> ^  crei£2, only A5 is consistent.
Using a random effects IV estimator to account for measurement error in 
schooling yields A6 =  0.068 (0.005)13, to be compared with the fixed effects esti­
mator A5, which as reported in Table 1.4 is 0.034 (0.012). The null hypothesis of 
(j) = cr£1£2 can be rejected at the 0.2% level using a standard Hausman (1978) test.
1.8 D iscussion
The main result of the previous sections is that the assumption of equal ability 
within pairs of monozygotic twins is violated in my sample. There are indications 
to this effect even in the previous co-twin literature on returns to schooling. For 
example, Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) report that for pairs where two twins had 
obtained different levels of schooling, 11% stated a reason which could be directly 
interpreted as indicating an ability difference (such as ’’one twin was better at 
books”). Similarly, Bonjour et al (2003) provide evidence that ability differences 
do matter, as out of the 38% of twins who went to different classes, half indicated 
ability differences as the reason. In both these studies however, these findings are 
interpreted as providing support for the idea that ability differences are relatively
13Note that the 7.2% reported in 1.3 is not based on a random effects estimator.
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unimportant. The only directly comparable finding that I am aware of is in 
Griliches (1979), who reports a regression coefficient of just 0.13 for the within- 
pair effect of one standard deviation in IQ on years of schooling, based on a small 
sample of just 76 pairs of male monozygotic twins. In my much larger and more 
representative sample, this figure is 0.52.
It has been conceded that although we do not know whether ability is more 
familial than is schooling, within-pair estimates can still be used as an upper 
bound on the returns to schooling, under the assumption that ability bias is 
positive as is commonly thought (Bound and Solon (1999))14. Given that within- 
pair IV estimates are generally lower than the cross-sectional OLS estimates, co­
twin estimates then contain information allowing us to tighten the bounds on 
the possible values of the returns to schooling. The central premises of this type 
of bounds argument, that ability bias can be taken to be positive a priori and 
that the suitability of an identification method therefore can be determined on the 
basis of the results it provides - if lower than OLS, then accept as an improvement 
- is dubious from a methodological perspective. Furthermore, such reasoning 
naturally rests on the assumption that the instruments for schooling are valid. As 
noted in the introduction, this is far from innocuous, and the potential reduction 
in bias must be weighed carefully against the plausibility of this assumption.
A crucial question is to what extent these results generalise to other coun­
tries. Returns to schooling vary across countries (Harmon et al. (2003)), and 
in principle so could the importance of ability bias. However, the argument in
1 4 Note, however, that Bound and Solon (1999) do not strictly advocate the co-twin approach, 
but merely point out this logical implication.
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this chapter rests not mainly on the magnitudes of the estimates from the wage 
equation, but on (i) the direct within-pair association of IQ with wages holding 
schooling constant, and (ii) on the significant within-pair associations between IQ 
and schooling. As long as within-pair dynamics are not substantially different in 
Sweden compared to other countries, these empirical findings constitute a general 
methodological argument against using within-twin differences for the estimation 
of returns to schooling, and in favour of placing greater weight on estimates based 
on alternative identification approaches.
1.9 Conclusion
Using a unique dataset of 890 pairs of male monozygotic twins’ schooling, income 
and IQ, strong evidence is found against the usefulness of the assumption of equal 
ability within twin pairs. It is found that within twin pairs, differences in IQ make 
a significant contribution to differences in earnings as well as education, and that 
inclusion of IQ in the wage equation causes within-pair point estimates for the 
returns to schooling to decline considerably.
These findings cast doubt on the usefulness of the estimates derived from the 
co-twin literature, and provide an argument in favour of placing relatively greater 
credence to alternative approaches to identifying the returns to schooling.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: Sample representativeness with respect to income, education, and IQ
Main sample Population
Income 360 338
228 -
Schooling 12.9 1 2 .0
2 .6 -
IQ 0 .1 2 0 .0
0.92 1 .0
Age 42.9
7.6
Obs 1780 -
Notes: Income is in 1000 SEK (6 SEK appr 1 USD)
IQ is measured in standard deviations, standardised against the group of all twins 
who answered the STAGE or SALT survey, and for whom there is conscription IQ data 
(12366 observations in total).
Population data is from Statistics Sweden 
Population data is for only men, as in main sample 
Schooling data for population is for cohorts born 1952-1972 
Income data for population is for cohorts born 1950-1970 
Schooling data for sample is based on self-reported education
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Table 1.2: Probit of being above threshold on IQ, age, education (extended main 
sample)
Dep. variable: full-time proxy
IQ 0.062 -0 .0 0 0
dF/dx 0.004 -0 .0 0 0
(0.82) (-0 .1 0 )
E d U su R V E Y -0.04 -0.03
dF/dx -0.003 -0 .0 0 2
(-1.57) (-1.34)
Age 0.01 0 .0 2 * 0 .0 1
...dF/dx 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 * 0 .0 0 1
(1.32) (1.97) (1.51)
Observations
Pseudo-R2
1862
0.013
1862
0.008
1862
0 .0 1 2
Notes: Administrative measure of schooling used as instrument for self-reported 
years of schooling
Based on sample of individuals in pairs where both twins have data on schooling, 
IQ, and income
t-statistics within parentheses
45
Table 1.3: Comparability with previous literature
Sample Literature Country/ies Sources
Co-twin similarity
Corr(StSt) 0.73 0 .6 6 US AK1994
0.75 US AR1998
0.70 Australia M1995
CorriTiT*) 0.82 0 .8 6 BM1981
Instruments
0 .8 8 ~0.90 US AK1994
0.92 US AR1998
0 .8 8 Australia M1995
0 .8 8 Sweden 11999
Corr(A5J.AS;„st) 0.65 0.57-0.83 US AK1994
0.62-0.76 US R1999
Labour market
(3IV (twins) 7.2% ~8 % US, UK. C1999, B2003
6.4% Australia M1995
5.2% Sweden 11999
P f e ,i v 3.4% ~7% US, UK C1999, B2003
4.5% Australia M1995
(4.2%) Sweden 11999
8\nyi/STi 0.16 0.27 US BG2002
Corr(S*,Ti) 0.51 0.55 US N1996
Notes: Abbreviations of sources: AK1994 - Ashenfelter and Kruger (1994); AR1998 
- Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998); M1995 - Miller et al. (1995); BM1981 - Bouchard and 
McGue (1981); 11999 - Isacsson (1999); R1999 - Rouse (1999); C1999 - Card (1999); 
B2003 - Bonjour et al. (2003); BG 2 0 0 2  - Bowles and Gintis (2 0 0 2 ); N1996 - Neisser et 
al. (1996).
Card (1999), Bowles and Gintis (2 0 0 2 ) and Neisser et al. (1996) are all surveys or 
meta-analyses.
The correlation between noisy schooling and IQ from the literature is based primarily 
on childhood IQ scores.
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Isacsson (1999) analyses men and women jointly, using income from 1987-1993 
Within-pair estimates for Isacsson (1999) are based on imputed within-pair reliabil­
ity ratios to correct for measurement error, and as such are not strictly comparable to 
the other within-pair figures in the table.
The sample "correlation" of schooling and instrument for schooling was derived as 
the square root of R 2 when regressing self-reported years of schooling on the set of 
administrative schooling dummies used as instruments.
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Table 1.4: Two simple tests of within-pair ability differences
FE, IV F E ,I V F E
Vij Vij Sij
Sij 0.034** 0.029* -
(0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 2 )
Tij 0.074** 0.517**
(0.028) (0.115)
Observations 1780 1780 1780
Groups 890 890 890
Notes: Standard error within parentheses 
* 5%; ** 1%
Uij is the natural logarithm of total income from employment in 2005 
Sn is self-reported years of schooling
Adminstrative dummies for highest degree attained used as instruments for years of 
schooling
is results from IQ test at around age 18, in standard deviations
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Table 1.5: Two simple tests of within-pair ability differences, robustness checks
FE, IV FE, IV F E Pairs #  Obs
HVij) HVij) Sij
Excl. 5% Sii 0.030* 0.025 - 846 1692
Tij
(0.013) (0.013)
0 .1 0 0 **
(0.034)
0.322*
(0.137)
Alt. IQ Sij 0.034** 0.028* - 890 1780
Tij
(0 .0 1 2 ) (0 .0 1 2 )
0.076**
(0.028)
0.522**
(0.115)
Regr ±5 Instr Sij 0.035** 0.031** - 890 1780
Tij
(0 .0 1 1 ) (0 .0 1 2 )
0.071*
(0.028)
0.600**
(0.124)
Low threshold Sij 0.031* 0.026* - 900 1800
Tij
(0.013) (0.013)
0.068*
(0.029)
0.521**
(0.114)
High threshold Sij 0.036** 0.023* - 791 1582
Tij
(0 .0 1 0 ) (0 .0 1 1 )
0.059*
(0.024)
0.430**
(0 .1 2 2 )
Notes: Standard error within parentheses 
* 5%; ** 1%
Uij is the natural logarithm of total income from employment in 2005 
s »  is self-reported years of schooling
Adminstrative dummies for highest degree attained used as instruments for years of 
schooling
Tij is results from IQ test at around age 18, in standard deviations
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Chapter 2 
Sm art or selfish? - th e role o f 
cognitive behaviour in the  
ultim atum  bargaining gam e
2.1 Introduction
In the ultimatum game, one agent (the “proposer”) gets to propose how to allo­
cate a sum of money between himself and another agent (the “responder”). The 
responder then accepts or rejects this offer. If he accepts, the proposer and the 
responder are paid in accordance with the proposed split. If the responder rejects, 
both players earn nothing. With self-interested income-maximising players, the 
game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, where the proposer offers zero 
or the smallest possible positive amount (in a discrete choice space) and the re­
sponder accepts this offer. Early experimental work documented that proposers
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typically offer a significant share of the pie, the modal offer is a fifty-fifty split, 
and responders routinely reject offers perceived as unfair (Guth et al (1982)). 
These findings have subsequently been corroborated in different subject pools, 
with different stakes and in more elaborate settings (See Camerer (2003) for an 
extensive survey).
The observed outcome of the ultimatum bargaining game - that substantial 
shares are offered by the proposer, and that low offers generally are rejected - 
stands in stark contrast to the sub-game perfect equilibrium predicted if agents 
are assumed to be materially self-interested and rational. In this chapter I examine 
the extent to which departures from the rationality assumption can explain the 
typically observed behaviour in ultimatum bargaining games. Examining data 
from a sample of 895 individuals, aged 23-48 and drawn from a population register 
of twins, I estimate the effect of IQ on behaviour in the ultimatum game and 
explore the role of background variables. The explanatory value of IQ is marginal 
for all four aspects of behaviour examined, and only statistically significant1 in 
two out of four cases.
Notably, deviations from the subgame perfect equilibrium both in terms of 
proposer behaviour and responder behaviour remain qualitatively unchanged even 
among individuals with IQ more than two standard deviations larger than the 
population average. This indicates that failure of the assumption of rationality is 
unlikely to be the driver behind these results, and constitutes evidence in favour 
of preference-based explanations as examined in the literature.
Unless otherwise stated, statistical significance will be evaluated at the 5% level throughout 
this paper.
In the next section, I provide a brief background on the ultimatum game, and 
on the literature relating IQ to various behavioural departures from standard self- 
interested rationality. This is followed by a description of the data in Section 2.3. 
Section 2.4 contains results from my empirical analysis followed, in Section 2.5, 
by a discussion of my findings. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 T he u ltim atum  bargaining gam e
As noted above, the generally observed outcome of the ultimatum bargaining 
game - that substantial shares are offered by the proposer, and that low offers 
normally are rejected - constitutes a marked deviation from the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium predicted if agents are assumed to be motivated exclusively by ma­
terial self-interest. In this context, it should be pointed out that the sub-game 
perfect equilibrium is not the obvious prediction, and that allocating large shares 
to the responder is consistent with a set of standard Nash equilibria. Nevertheless, 
the commonly observed rejections of offers in the second stage are not consistent 
with any equilibrium where such agents’ preferences are bounded by the standard 
assumption of non-satiation.
One common interpretation of the observed behaviour is that people are con­
cerned with the fairness of an outcome, and are willing to accept a loss for them­
selves in order to punish behaviour which is perceived as unacceptable. The term 
“strong reciprocity” has been proposed to describe the tendency of an agent to re­
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ward good behaviour and punish bad behaviour, the latter even at a net expected 
cost to the agent himself (see Fehr et al (2002)).
This interpretation has inspired more elaborate games, with results generally 
conforming to the patterns predicted by the idea of “strong reciprocity” . For 
instance, Fehr et al (1997) design an experimental labour market where workers 
can choose to adhere to an effort level stipulated in a simple contract offered by 
the employer, or to provide more or less effort. Shirking leads randomly to a 
monetary punishment with a certain probability. In the final stage, employers 
then choose whether to punish or reward the worker by multiplying the worker’s 
payoff by a factor between 0 and 2. The further away from one is this factor, 
the more costly is the action to the employer. The experimental evidence shows 
that workers reward generous contracts (i.e., those providing a higher job rent) 
by shirking less often, and that employers are willing to take a cost to themselves 
to reward (punish) high (low) effort. Fehr et al (1997) also find that workers 
anticipate the reciprocity of the employers, by providing lower effort when the 
final punishment/reward stage is removed.
The results from this extended literature seem to indicate that people, even 
when interacting with completely anonymous counterparts where reputational 
concerns should be non-existent, nevertheless exhibit strongly reciprocal social 
preferences. A number of authors (Bowles and Gintis (2002), Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2003), Fehr and Gachter (2002), Gintis (2000)) have even speculated that this 
demonstrates that humans possess innately other-regarding preferences which de­
veloped under conditions of group selection, although the empirical and logical
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basis of such claims have been criticised fiercely (Burnham and Johnson (2005)
A general alternative to the theory of "strong reciprocity" is that people are 
suspicious about the experimental situation and care about reputation, (see Levitt 
and List (2007) for a discussion of the roles of reputation and anonymity in ex­
periments). This reputation-management may be conscious or sub-conscious, and 
may involve acquired behaviour or tendencies hard-wired into our neural circuitry 
(see, e.g., Burnham and Johnson (2005))
From the perspective of the researcher, who knows that there are no reputa­
tional effects arising from the experimental situation, we might conceive of such 
tendencies as a form of failure of the rationality assumption; According to these 
theories, individuals are not acting in their objectively best interests, although 
they would if they just knew how to. As a corollary, individuals should not act 
as if motivated by social preferences when placed in an analogously one-shot sit­
uation, but with which they are familiar.
Some support for this idea comes from List (2006), who evaluates the gift- 
exchange hypothesis using a field experiment on traders of sports cards in a mar­
ket, and compares it to the results from a similar laboratory experiment. In the 
field experiment, experimenters make either a high or a low offer to actual sports 
card traders in an actual market. The experimenters do not reveal their status, so 
traders are not aware of these offers being part of an experiment. When traders 
are local, they tend to reward high offers with a higher quality card, but this 
effect disappears when traders are not from the same region ("nonlocals"), i.e. 
when the probability of repeated interactions is low. When using standard labo­
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ratory conditions, List (2006) nevertheless finds the standard outcome of positive 
reciprocity in the form of gift-exchange. These results suggest that reputational 
effects, and not social preferences, are the cause of the observed gift-exchange in 
that particular market.
Interpreting rejections in the ultimatum game in terms of a conscious or sub­
conscious trade-off based on the cost of violating social norms, provides one pos­
sible explanation for why IQ would matter in the experimental situation. If IQ 
measures a general problem-solving ability, it is reasonable to think that individ­
uals with high IQ would also be better at correctly interpreting the cues of the 
experimental situation and at understanding that the probability and expected 
effect of their behaviour becoming known is negligible.
Another, simpler, way of conceiving of how a failure of the rationality as­
sumption to hold might provoke "anomalous" behaviour, of the kind generally 
observed in the ultimatum game, is if higher cognitive ability facilitates effortless 
understanding of the payoff structure of the game as explained to the subject. 
Whereas, with enough deliberation, most people can plausibly be expected to un­
derstand what the best strategy is for the responder in the ultimatum game, it is 
not obvious that test subjects always invest the cognitive effort necessary.
Oechssler et al (2008) examine the impact of temporary emotional states on 
responder behaviour in the ultimatum bargaining game, and how the differential 
effect relates to scores on a "cognitive reflection test", CRT (Frederick (2005)). 
This three-item test measures the extent to which an individual tends to think 
twice when faced with a task of a cognitive nature. Respondents are asked ques­
55
tions which have one intuitive, but wrong, answer, but where the correct answer 
is relatively straight-forward as long as the individual overcomes the first instinc­
tive answer. For example, if a ball and a bat cost $110 together, and a bat costs 
$100 more than a ball, how much does a ball cost? The quick intuitive answer 
is $10, whereas the correct answer is $5. In the standard treatment, Oechssler et 
al. (2008) report no appreciable difference between the rejection rates of reflective 
decision-makers (2 or 3 correct answers on the CRT) and impulsive decision­
makers (0 or 1 correct answer on the CRT). Furthermore, Oechssler et al. (2008) 
find that in the standard implementation where subjects are paid in money, rejec­
tion rates do not significantly decrease even when responders are given, 24 hours 
later, a chance to revise their action.
This distinction between decision-making under short and long time-frames 
has also been made by Gneezy and List (2006), although with the opposite re­
sult. Gneezy and List (2006) use two field experiments to test the gift-exchange 
hypothesis, a form of positive reciprocity, in the field. They find that although 
workers are willing in the short-term to reward higher remuneration with higher 
effort, this effect subsided after a few hours. The authors speculate that this may 
be due to the difference between "hot" decision-making, as in experiments, and 
"cold" decision-making, as in tasks in the field that have a longer duration.
2.2.2 IQ
There is a small but growing literature in economics attempting to view prefer­
ences and behaviour through the prism of cognitive ability. Dohmen et al. (2007)
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and Benjamin et al. (2006) study the correlation between measures of cognitive 
ability and various measures of risk preferences, and find that risk aversion tends 
to associated with lower scores on an IQ test. Burnham et al (2008) examine 
behaviour in the p-beauty game, and find that subjects with higher scores on 
a standard IQ test make substantially lower guesses, and are also closer to the 
revenue-maximizing guess. (In the case of the p-beauty game, this is simply p 
times the average guess. See Camerer (2003) for an explanation of the p-beauty 
game and the dominating theories concerning behaviour in this game). In the 
simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma game, Kanazawa and Fontaine (2007) find that 
defectors have on average about one standard deviation higher IQ than cooper­
ators. In a sequential prisoner’s dilemma game, Burks et al (2008) find that in 
the second stage, subjects with higher IQ tend to be more likely to defect when 
the opponent has defected in the first stage, and to be more likely to cooperate 
when the opponent has cooperated.
As of yet, there is however no large study examining the impact of measured IQ 
on behaviour in the ultimatum bargaining game. Brandstatter and Guth (2002) 
examine correlations between self-assessed cognitive ability and ultimatum game 
behaviour in a sample of just 26 subjects and find no association. Self-assessed 
measures, however, contain considerable noise and the use of such measures, rather 
than conventional test results, give rise to severe interpretational issues due to the 
potential interrelationship between ultimatum game behaviour and biases in self­
perception.
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2.3 D ata
2.3.1 Participants
The experimental data was gathered by a team of researchers2 in two rounds of ex­
perimental sessions undertaken in 2006 and 2008, respectively, in 15 Swedish cities 
and towns (Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmo, Borlange, Helsingborg, Jonkoping, 
Kristianstad, Linkoping, Lund, Norrkoping, Orebro, Umea, Uppsala, Vasteras, 
and Vaxjo). Since the main purpose of gathering the data was to estimate heri- 
tability of behaviour in experiments designed to elicit social preferences3, subjects 
were recruited from the population of twins in Sweden. Contact information on 
twins in the region of a particular experimental session was obtained from the 
Swedish Twin Registry, which contains all twins born in Sweden from 1926 and 
onwards4. Twins born between 1960 and 1985 were contacted by email and mail. 
Only pairs where both twins could participate in the same session were ultimately 
included in the experiment, to ensure that conditions for both twins would be as 
similar as possible, and, specifically, to avoid communication between sessions.
2.3.2 U ltim atu m  gam e test procedure
The ultimatum game was implemented using the strategy method: In the first 
stage, all subjects were assigned the role of proposer, were matched randomly to 
an anonymous responder from a different experimental session, and were asked
2David Cesarini, Magnus Johannesson, Bjorn Wallace
3For other studies using data from these experimental sessions, see Burnham et al. (2008), 
Cesarini et al. (forthcoming), Cesarini et al. (2008), Wallace et al. (2007).
4See Lichtenstein et al. (2006) for a description of the Swedish Twin Registry.
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to indicate in writing what share, in increments of 1 0 , out of a total amount 
of 100 Swedish krona5 they would offer to the respondent. In the second stage, 
all subjects were assigned the role of responder, were matched randomly with 
an anonymous proposer from a different experimental session and different from 
the one in the first stage, and were asked what offers they would and would not 
accept. From this strategy set, I use the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) in 
the range 0-50% as my measure of responder behaviour. In the range 0-50%, all 
subjects except one (who was therefore excluded) indicated a monotonic strategy, 
i.e. accepting all offers greater than the MAO. The relevant experimental data 
thus contains, for each subject, one offer and one MAO as measures of behaviour 
in the ultimatum bargaining game.
2.3.3 C ognitive ability
As part of the experiment, the subjects were asked to take a short standard IQ test 
developed by Psykologiforlaget (Sjoberg, Sjoberg, and Forssen (2006)). This test 
consists of three sections: logical problems, verbal analogies, and mathematical 
series, and the maximum time for completion is 20 minutes. The population 
average and standard deviation, as provided by the test developers, were then used 
to standardise each participant’s score. For simplicity, the unit of measurement 
used in this chapter is simply the number of population standard deviations away 
from the population mean, rather than linearly transforming the scores into an 
IQ value.
5 6  Swedish krona is approximately 1 US dollar.
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2.3 .4  R epresentativeness
To assess the representativeness of the sample, the experimental data was matched 
to data on taxable income, highest educational level attained, and marital sta­
tus from Statistics Sweden. The educational data was then converted into years 
of schooling using estimates from a representative random sample reported in 
Isacsson (2004).
Table 2.1 contains a comparison of sample income, education, and marital 
status with the population average for the cohorts aged 25-44.
As is common in laboratory experiments, participants are more educated than 
the average in the population, in this case 14.0 years compared to 12.8. IQ test 
results are higher as well, with the average participant in the experiment having 
an IQ about half a standard deviation higher than the population mean.
Average income is similar to the population average for women, but about 
1 0% lower for men, and marital status is lower for men as well as for women, with 
27% married in the sample, as opposed to 37% in the population as a whole. The 
average age in the sample is 34.8 years.
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2.4 R esults
2.4.1 O bserved behaviour
Figure 1 shows the distribution of offers. As is generally observed in the ultimatum 
bargaining game, almost all offers are within the 30-506 range. The mean is 48.6, 
and the median and mode are 50. Only 2.7% of the subjects offer 0 or 10 (the 
only sub-game perfect Nash equilibria), but more than 80% offer a fifty-fifty split. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of recorded minimum offers that an individual 
would accept. The mean MAO is 36.8, with median 40 and mode 50. These 
results conform well to those found in the literature, (see, e.g., the summary 
in Falk and Fischbacher (2006)). A complete set of summary statistics on the 
observed experimental behaviour is given in Table 2 .2 .
The expected payoff from any particular offer or minimum acceptable offer 
depends on the distribution of strategies pursued in the relevant population. Us­
ing the sample distributions of MAOs and offers, the expected payoff from each 
possible offer and MAO, respectively, is calculated.
Table 2.3 contains expected monetary payoffs in the experiment for each value 
of minimum acceptable offer. By mathematical necessity, the expected payoffs 
are weakly decreasing in MAO, although the expected payoff from accepting no 
less than 0, i.e. accepting any offer, and accepting no less than 40 are virtually 
the same. In other words, in this setting, the expected cost from devations from 
the simple sub-game equilibrium are very small. The bottom row of Table 2.3
6For expositional clarity, the outcome variables will be referred to without a % sign or unit, 
rather than in percent of the pie or Swedish krona.
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displays the number of subjects choosing each particular MAO.
Table 2.4 presents the expected payoff from an offer, conditional on the ob­
served distribution of minimum acceptable offers. An offer of 50 has the highest 
expected payoff, and offering 60 has a higher expected payoff than offering 40. As 
offers get closer to zero, expected payoffs to the proposer get smaller, although the 
expected payoff from offering 10 and 20, respectively, are virtually the same. The 
bottom row of Table 2.4 displays the number of subjects choosing each particular 
offer.
2.4.2 R egression  analysis o f th e  role o f  IQ 
Responder behaviour
In this section, I analyse the role of cognitive abilities in explaining behaviour 
where the income-maximizing choice is not affected by the behaviour of any other 
player. In the ultimatum game, this type of weakly monotonic situation arises with 
respect to the minimum acceptable offer (MAO). The extent to which cognitive 
abilities can explain the expected payoff of the minimum acceptable offer chosen 
is also examined.
In Table 2.5, results are presented from a regression analysis of minimum 
acceptable offer (MAO) and the expected value of MAO on IQ, and on IQ and 
two sets of covariates.
Columns 1-3 contain coefficients estimated when using offer as the dependent 
variable. Five results emerge: First, IQ matters for minimum acceptable offer, 
but although this effect is statistically significant, it is small in magnitude. A
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difference in IQ of one standard deviation is associated with a lower MAO of ap­
proximately 3-3.5, or roughly one tenth of the average MAO. Second, this effect is 
only marginally affected by the inclusion of covariates, dropping to 2.7 (negative) 
when including the full set of covariates - age, sex, yearly income, years of educa­
tion, and marital status. Third, age matters positively, but weakly, with 10 years 
corresponding to an increase in MAO of about 3. Fourth, the share of variance 
explained is small, about 6 %, even when including the full set of covariates. Fi­
nally, the inclusion of income, education, and marital status does not significantly 
increase the predictive fit (p =  0.44) compared to the model with only age and 
sex as covariates.
Columns 4-6 contain the corresponding results using expected value of MAO 
as the dependent variable. All results are similar in terms of significance and 
interpretation, but far removed in terms of magnitude. An increase in IQ of 
one standard deviation corresponds to an increase in the expected payoff of only 
0.2. This discrepancy is not surprising given the compressed distribution of the 
expected payoffs. As shown in Table 2.3, the expected payoff varies very little 
even between the extremes of 0 and 50.
Proposer behaviour
In this section, I examine whether cognitive ability predicts behaviour in cases 
where the income-maximising choice is a function of other players’ actions, in 
this game corresponding to the choice of offer. As in the preceeding section, the 
expected payoff of the behaviour is employed as an alternative dependent variable.
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It should be noted that in the case of offers, this transformation is not monotonous, 
since expected payoff is maximised for a value of 50 (as seen in Table 2.4), rather 
than 0  or 1 0 0 .
In Table 2.6, results are presented from a regression analysis of offer and the 
expected value of offer on IQ, and on IQ and the same two sets of covariates as in 
the preceeding section. Four results can be noted: First, across all specifications, 
the estimated coefficient on IQ is small and statistically insignificant. Second, 
of all covariates only sex explains behaviour, with women offering about 1.9 less 
then men. Third, again the inclusion of income, education, and marital status 
does not significantly increase the predictive fit for either of the two dependent 
variables (p =  0.38 and p = 0.97) compared to the models with only age and sex 
as covariates. Finally, the total share of variance explained is negligible, less than 
1 .2 %, in all specifications.
Exclusion of potential outliers
In the proposer stage, seven individuals offered 100 to the responder. Although 
such preferences in this particular game are surely feasible, it is still noteworthy 
that noone offered either 90 or 80, and only one subject offered 70. Based on this 
curious observed distribution of offers, it is possible that the offers of 1 0 0  were the 
results of misunderstanding the answer sheets.
For this reason, I re-estimate the effect on MAO, offer, and the expected payoffs 
from MAO and offer, excluding these seven observations. The results of this 
robustness test are presented in Table 2.7. Excluding the seven potential outliers
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does not appreciably affect the estimated association between IQ and behaviour, 
which remains statistically significant only for MAO and expected payoff from 
MAO, and then only with limited explanatory power.
2.4.3 G roup com parisons 
High-IQ individuals
In this subsection, I examine whether the assumption of rationality may be prop­
erly viewed as applying fully only to the top percentiles of the IQ distribution. 
In other words, rather than taking a continuous approach to the relationship be­
tween cognitive ability and behaviour, as in the previous sections, I simply examine 
whether the observed behaviour differs between individuals whose measured IQ 
corresponds to the the top 5% of the population (approximately the top 15% of 
the sample), and the rest of the sample. These results are presented in Table 2.8. 
I also display results from a corresponding comparison using individuals from the 
top 1% of the population IQ distribution.
Three results can be noted from this group comparison. First, although the 
difference between either of the two high-IQ groups and the rest of the sample 
is statistically significant for both MAO and the expected payoff from MAO, the 
bulk of observed deviations from the weakly dominant strategies (to accept offers 
as low as 0 or 10, respectively) remains. The average subject in the top 1% of the 
population distribution still rejects offers of less than about 30.
Second, the general pattern observed is closely in line with the results from 
the regression analysis above, in that IQ appears to matter somewhat for the
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responder stage, where there is a weakly dominant strategy (accept or reject), 
whereas it appears to play no role for the proposer stage, where payoffs depend 
on the successive play of the opponent (the offer stage)
Third, even for individuals in the top 1% of the population IQ distribution, 
corresponding to approximately the top 5% of the sample distribution, the ex­
pected payoff from the MAO is only a meagre 0.6 higher on average than for 
the average individual in the sample. In the actual experimental situation, the 
expected gains from higher IQ are negligible in magnitude.
"Narrowly rational" individuals
To examine whether there is anything which distinguishes players who adhere to 
the subgame perfect equilibrium generally associated with the assumption of self­
ish income-maximising agents, I partition the sample into those who adhere to the 
corresponding SPNE strategies, and those who do not. There are 18 individuals 
who both (i) offered 0  or 1 0 , and (ii) accepted all offers higher or equal to 0  or 
10. I label these as "narrowly rational", to indicate that although their behaviour 
is consistent with play in an environment where all agents are selfishly rational, 
it is not necessary consistent with income-maximising play when other players 
are believed, with positive probability, to play strategies other than those of the 
SPNE referred to above. In other words, these are the individuals exhibiting the 
behaviour predicted, through backward induction, for homo oeconomicus in an 
environment of likes.
Table 2.9 presents a comparison of means. The narrowly rational individuals
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tend to have slightly lower income, be slightly less likely to be married, have 
slightly higher IQ, and are slightly more likely to be male, but none of these 
differences are statistically significant.
As some of the observed differences appear to be negatively correlated, in par­
ticular lower income and higher male ratio, I examine the probability of being 
narrowly rational in a probit model. The results are presented in Table 2.10. 
Across a range of specifications, none of the explanatory variables have a statisti­
cally significant coefficient, including IQ.
2.5 D iscussion
The results above give weak support for the idea that a failure of rationality is 
a contributing factor in explaining the commonly observed behaviour in ultima­
tum bargaining games, that players depart substantially from the self-interested 
income-maximising subgame perfect equilibrium. Responders have a weakly dom­
inant strategy of always accepting positive (or non-negative) offers. Yet, even in 
this unconditional setting, IQ alone explains less than five percent of variation, 
and even among individuals from the top 5% of the population in terms of IQ, the 
bulk of the deviation from the weakly dominant strategy persists. A one standard 
deviation increase in IQ is associated with a drop of 3-3.5 in minimum acceptable 
offer (MAO).
In cases where the optimality of a strategy depends on the actions of the other 
player(s), I find no association between IQ and behaviour. Neither the actual 
offers, nor their expected payoff based on the ex post realised distribution of
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MAOs, are even weakly associated with IQ. It should also be noted that more 
than 80% of all subjects play the optimal strategy - to offer 50 - given the ex post 
choices of the respondents
Yet, as is generally found, there is substantial heterogeneity with respect to 
responder behaviour. A failure of rationality to be the culprit naturally lends 
support for preference-based explanations holding the key to understanding these 
heterogeneities. But what might account for this heterogeneity in preferences?
In this chapter, I provide some explorative empirical analysis of the role of 
income, education, marital status, age, and sex in explaining heterogeneities in 
observed behaviour. Admittedly, when including demographic covariates, there 
is potentially important endogeneity between both stipulated dependent variable 
(behaviour in the ultimatum game), stipulated treatment variable (IQ), and stip­
ulated controls (e.g. income and education). The interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients is therefore not straightforward. It can nevertheless be noted that the 
effects of IQ across dependent variables are fairly robust to the inclusion of these 
demographic variables in the estimating equations.
Whereas some variation in MAO can be explained by age and sex, the inclu­
sion, in addition to IQ, sex, and age, of income, education, and marital status in a 
linear regression model does not contribute significantly to its explanatory power. 
Furthermore, the joint addition to R 2 from inclusion of all these five variables is 
never more than 0.02, which still in all cases leaves more than 90% of the variation 
unexplained by IQ or these five conventional demographic variables.
The potential role of genetic differences as an underlying cause of observed het­
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erogeneities in economic preferences has been explored by Burnham et al (2008), 
Cesarini et al (forth), Cesarini et al (2008), Wallace et al (2007).7 Other recent 
research along the same lines includes Fowler et al (2007), who examine the role 
of genetics in explaining variation in political preferences. In all the above five 
papers, genetic variation is robustly found to explain a moderate share of observed 
variation, in the range of 25-40%. The results in this chapter suggest that the 
mediating channel is not the genetic transmission of general cognitive abilities.
Obviously, IQ and rationality are not immediately corresponding notions. The 
findings of this chapter however complement those of Oechssler et al (2008), as 
reported above, who find that more reflective decision-makers (as measured by a 
three-item ’’cognitive reflection test", due to Frederick (2005)) are equally likely as 
impulsive decision-makers to reject an unequal split in the ultimatum bargaining 
game. Furthermore, Oechssler et al (2008) find that in the standard implementa­
tion where subjects are paid in money, rejection rates do not significantly decrease 
even when responders are given, 24 hours later, a chance to revise their action.
Taken together, these findings suggest that neither lack of sufficient cognitive 
ability, nor failure to apply it properly, is responsible for the observed rejections in 
the ultimatum bargaining game. Instead, preference-based explanations allowing 
for variations of the assumptions of self-interest are more likely to hold the answer.
7These four papers use data from the same experimental sessions as is this paper.
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2.6 Conclusion
Using a large and representative sample of 895 individuals, I examine the effect 
of IQ on proposer and responder behaviour in the ultimatum game. I find no 
effects on proposer behaviour and statistically significant, but small, effects on 
responder behaviour. These findings remain when controlling for a range of de­
mographic variables, and when juxtaposing individuals from the top 5% and 1% of 
the population with the rest of the sample. Furthermore, the 2% of subjects who 
played the simple subgame perfect Nash equilibrium did not differ significantly 
on neither IQ nor any of the demographic variables examined. No statistically or 
economically significant additional explanatory power was obtained from income, 
education, and marital status.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Comparison of demographic characteristics 
Main Sample Population
All Women Men All Women Men
Education 14.0 14.0 14.0 12.8 13.1 12.5
(2.3) (2.4) (2.2)
IQ test 0.53 0.43 0.88 0.0 - -
(1.03) (1.00) (1.04) 1.0 - -
Income 207 198 242 235 197 271
(144) (132) (177)
Marital status 0.27 0.28 0.22 0.37 0.40 0.33
(0.44) (0.45) (0.42)
Age 34.8 35.3 33.1 25-44 25-44 25-44
(7.5) (7.5) (7.2)
N 895 700 195 2.4 M 1.2 M 1.2 M
Notes: Standard deviations within parentheses.
Income in 1000 SEK,
IQ test results standardised to the entire population
Marital status is 1 for "married", where co-habitation counted as "not married"
In population data, education data is missing for about 0.5%
For 4 female observations education is missing, and for 2 observations income and 
marital status are missing
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics of behaviour
All
Mean S.D
Women
Mean S.D
Men
Mean S.D
MAO 36.8 17.3 37.0 17.3 36.1 17.0
Expected payoff from MAO 47.4 0.9 47.4 0.9 47.5 0.9
Offer 48.6 9.4 48.2 9.0 49.8 10.7
Expected payoff from offer 47.2 9.0 47.5 8.4 46.1 10.7
N 895 700 195
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Table 2.3: Expected payoff from minimum acceptable offer (MAO)
Share 50 40 30 20 10 0
E(payoff) 46.5 48.0 48.4 48.5 48.6 48.6
N 432 203 62 25 87 86
Notes: The expected payoff is calculated as the expectation over offers, where offers 
lower than the minimum acceptable offer are set to zero.
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Table 2.4: Expected payoff from offer
Share 0 10 2 0 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1 0 0
E(payoff) 9.6 17.4 17.7 20.3 31.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 2 0 .0 10 .0 0 .0
N 15 8 5 10 35 801 13 1 0 0 7
Notes: The offer is the share proposed to the responder, whereas the expected payoff 
is to the proposer.
The expected payoff is calculated as the share left to the proposer, times the ex post 
probability that the offer is accepted by the responder.
74
Table 2.5: Responder behaviour - results from regressing MAO and expected
payoff from MAO on IQ and covariates
MAO Expected payoff from MAO
IQ -3.51** -3.05** -2.75** 0.24** 0 .2 1 ** 0.19**
(0.55) (0.57) (0.61) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 0.28** 0.26** -0 .0 2 ** -0 .0 2 **
(0.08) (0.10) (0.00) (0.01)
Sex -1.05 -0.74 0.05 0.03
(1.39) (1.43) (0.07) (0.08)
Income 0.28
(0.50)
-0 .0 1
(0.03)
Education -0.43
(0.26)
0 .0 2
(0.01)
Married -0.52
(1.39)
0.04
(0.07)
Constant 38.67** 29.41** 35.15** 47.30** 47.95** 47.72**
(0.63) (2.98) (4.73) (0.03) (0.16) (0.25)
Observations 895 895 891 895 895 891
R2 0.044 0.058 0.061 0.070 0.093 0.093
Notes: Standard errors within parentheses 
** p<0.01; * p<0.05  
Income in 100.000 SEK
Education in years of schooling, based on registry data from Statistics Sweden 
Co-habitation counted as "not married"
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Table 2.6: Proposer behaviour - results from regressing offer and expected payoff
from offer on IQ and covariates
Offer Expected payoff from offer
IQ -0.30 -0.36 -0.44 -0.40 -0.16 -0.15
(0.31) (0.32) (0.34) (0.29) (0.30) (0.33)
Age 0.04 -0 .0 1 0.08 0.09
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Sex -1.87* -1.80* 1 .2 0 1 .2 0
(0.78) (0.80) (0.74) (0.76)
Income 0.17
(0.28)
0 .0 0
(0.27)
Education 0.03
(0.15)
-0 .0 2
(0.14)
Married 1.24
(0.78)
-0.37
(0.74)
Constant 48.74** 48.87** 49.54** 47.43** 43.62** 43.58**
(0.35) (1.67) (2.66) (0.34) (1.59) (2.53)
Observations 895 895 891 895 895 891
R2 0 .0 0 1 0.008 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 1 0
Notes: Standard errors within parentheses 
** p<0.01; * p<0.05  
Income in 100.000 SEK
Education in years of schooling, based on registry data from Statistics Sweden 
Co-habitation counted as "not married"
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Table 2.7: Results from regressing behaviour on IQ and age - without possible 
outliers w r t behaviour variables
MAO E(MAO) Offer E(offer)
IQ -3.14** 0 .2 1 ** -0.14 -0.37
(-5.55) (6.92) (-0.51) (-1.36)
Age 0.30** -0 .0 2 ** 0.05 0.07*
(3.86) (-4.85) (1.21) (1.98)
Sex -1.83 0.07 -0.62 0.04
(-1.32) (0.94) (-0.89) (0.06)
Constant 29.75** 47.95** 47.11** 45.22**
(10.03) (301.56) (31.70) (31.82)
Observations
R 2
8 8 8
0.063
8 8 8
0.096
8 8 8
0.003
8 8 8
0.009
Notes: Excluding the seven observations who as proposers offered 100% to the 
respondent
Standard errors within parentheses 
** p<0.01; * p<0.05
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Table 2.8: High-IQ behaviour
All Top 5% Top 1%
Mean S.D Mean S.D p-value Mean S.D p-value
MAO 36.8 17.3 31.6 17.8 0.000 27.7 18.0 0 .0 0 1
E(payoff) of MAO 47.4 0.9 47.8 0.9 0.000 48.0 0 .8 0.000
Offer 48.6 9.4 48.0 7.1 0.378 47.3 7.9 0.270
E(payoff) of offer 47.2 9.0 46.8 8.4 0.525 46.4 9.5 0.545
N 895 133 44
Notes: p-value refers to t-test of equal means between high-IQ group and its com­
plement (i.e., not against the full sample)
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Table 2.9: Narrowly "selfish rational" behaviour
Not SPNE 
Mean S.D
SPNE
Mean S.D
p-value
Education 14.0 2.3 14.6 2 .0 0.25
IQ 0.525 1.03 0.687 1 .0 2 0.51
Income 208 144 180 175 0.51
Marital status 0.27 0.44 0.17 0.38 0.27
Age 34.9 7.5 33.6 8.4 0.54
Sex 0.78 0.41 0.89 0.32 0.18
N 877 18
Note: Subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium play is when offer is 0 or 10, and minimum  
acceptable offer is 0  or 1 0 .
For 4 observations education is missing, and for 2 observations income and marital 
status are missing
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Table 2.10: Probit analysis of "narrowly rational" (SPNE) behaviour
Dep. variable: 1 if individual is "narrowly rational"
IQ 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.66) (0.67) (0.15) (0.39)
Income -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(-0.81) (-0.79) (-0.51)
Education 0.003 0.002 0.002
(1.23) (1.12) (1.02)
Married -0.009 -0.009 -0.010
(-0.83) (-0.82) (-0.91)
Age - 0.000 - 0.000 0.000
(-0.79) (-0.58) (0.08)
Sex 0.013 0.014 0.012
(1.18) (1.25) (1.14)
Observations 895 895 895 891 891 891
Notes: Regression coefficients are marginal effects 
z-statistics within parentheses 
Income in 100.000 SEK
Education in years of schooling, based on registry data from Statistics Sweden 
Co-habitation counted as "not married"
** p<0.01; * p<0.05
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Chapter 3 
Is financial risk-taking behaviour 
genetically transm itted?
(Co-authored with David Cesarini, Magnus Johannesson, and Bjorn Wallace)
3.1 Introduction
Parents and their children exhibit considerable similarity in self-reported atti­
tudes toward risk (Charles and Hurst (2003), Dohmen et al. (2006), Hryshko et 
al. (2007)), as well as in their choice of what assets to hold (Chiteji and Stafford 
(1999)). Yet, little is known about the mechanisms generating these correlations. 
Do they arise because parents pass on genes for certain traits associated with 
risk preferences to their children, or is it, as often postulated, merely a reflec­
tion of parental socializing influences? In a recent string of papers (Wallace et 
al. (2007), Cesarini et al. (2008, forthcoming), laboratory experiments designed 
to elicit preferences were run on a sample of twins. Comparing the behaviour
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of monozygotic (MZ) twins to that of dizygotic (DZ) twins is a form of quasi­
experiment. MZ twins reared together share the same environment and the same 
genes, and while DZ twins reared together also share the same environment, their 
degree of genetic relatedness is no greater than that of ordinary siblings. A sig­
nificantly higher observed correlation for MZ twins than DZ twins is therefore 
usually taken as evidence that a trait is under genetic influence. Estimating fairly 
standard behaviour genetic models, the results in Wallace et al. (2007) and Ce­
sarini et al. (2008, forthcoming) suggest that heritability - the share of individual 
variation that can be explained by genetic influences - for a number of economic 
preferences, including risk preferences, is typically somewhere between 20 and 40 
%.
Yet, eliciting preferences experimentally has at least two distinct disadvan­
tages. First, there is genuine uncertainty about the extent to which laboratory 
behaviour generalizes to the field (Levitt and List (2007)). Second, the sample 
sizes in the above cited studies, though very large by behavioural economic stan­
dards, still do not allow for precise inference. In this chapter, we use microdata 
from the Swedish individualized pension savings account introduced in 2000 to 
extend the previous literature from the laboratory to the field. As part of the 
transition to a new pension system, virtually all adult Swedes born after 1938 had 
to make simultaneous investment decisions with potentially far-reaching effects on 
their post-retirement wealth. In particular, they had to compose an investment 
portfolio from a menu of more than six hundred funds. We take this event, which 
is known as the "Big Bang" of the Swedish financial sector, as a field experiment
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to infer risk preferences. Matching individual portfolio data to the Swedish Twin 
Registry, we then employ standard methods from behaviour genetics and estimate 
the heritability of preferences for financial risk-taking. Unlike small stake gambles 
in the laboratory, or attitudinal risk questions, the investment decisions made 
in the pension savings accounts are real financial decisions that have real eco­
nomic consequences. Moreover, our dataset is very large, allowing us to estimate 
parameters with much greater precision than previous experimental studies.
To our knowledge, this study is the first to use behaviour genetic techniques to 
document the heritability of risk-taking in the financial market, as well as outside 
the laboratory. There is, however, a related literature in economics which has con­
sidered economic outcome variables such as educational attainment, income and 
socioeconomic status (Taubman (1976), Behrman and Taubman (1989), Licht­
enstein et al. (1992), Plug and Vijverberg (2003), Bjorklund, Lindahl and Plug 
(2006), BjOrklund, Jantti, and Solon (2007), Sacerdote (2002, 2007)). The general 
idea behind these papers is to make reasonable assumptions about the genetic rela­
tionships of relatives to separate the effects of genetic and environmental variation 
(Sacerdote (forthcoming)). Behavior genetic techniques are in no way restricted 
to twins, and many of the above studies also include adoptees, as well as other 
sibling types. Taken together, adoption, sibling and twin studies point to a role 
for both genetic and cultural transmission of economic outcomes.
The estimates of heritability that we obtain match the laboratory evidence 
in Cesarini et al. (forthcoming) very closely, and suggest that approximately 25 
% of the individual variation in financial risk-taking is due to genetic influences.
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This implies that a significant portion of the previously observed parent-child 
resemblance in risk attitudes is due to genetic transmission. Furthermore, besides 
establishing that a key economic preference is heritable, an important result in 
and of itself, we believe that our findings have broader implications. For instance, 
the share of individual variation explained by genes is much higher than the R2s 
typically obtained in standard empirical models of financial risk-taking (Cohn et 
al. (1975), Palsson (1996), Palme et al. (2007)). In an early microdata study 
of portfolio choice Cohn et al. (1975) found R2s of approximately 0.10 using 
a set of demographic and socio-economic controls, while Palsson (1996) report 
substantially lower estimates for Swedish registry based data. Importantly, these 
results for individual portfolios of total asset holdings are close to the R2,s found 
when considering portfolio choice for the Swedish individualized pension savings 
accounts in isolation (S&ve-Soderbergh (2005), Palme et al. (2007)).
Our findings may also be relevant for research on the intergenerational trans­
mission of economic status. Reviewing the literature, Bowles and Gintis (2002) 
suggest that further study of non-cognitive behavioural traits and preferences may 
help explain the fact that even though income is heritable (Taubman (1976)), 
simple calibration exercises show that the genetic transmission of intelligence can 
account for at most a moderate share of the parent-child correlation. Poterba et 
al. (2000) show the substantial effects risk-preferences can have on accumulation 
of post-retirement wealth and thus potentially on intergenerational transmission 
of economic status.1
1 However, preferences are notoriously diffucult to measure, and attitudes toward risk is only 
one of many dimensions of preferences, whose individual effects may be small, but whose com-
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The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the Swedish 
Pension reform and our dataset. In Section 3.3, we describe twin methodology. 
In Section 3.4, we present our results, and relate them to previous findings. In 
section 3.5 we investigate and discuss the robustness and generalizability of our 
findings, and in section 3.6 we relate them to the literature on behaviour genetics 
and the biological basis of risk preferences. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 D ata
3.2.1 T he Swedish P ension  R eform
In 1994, legislation gradually introducing a new pension system was passed by the 
Swedish parliament in response to demographic challenges and underfinancing of 
the pay-as-you-go system that had been in place since the 1960s.2 The new system 
is based on a contribution rate of 18.5 percent on earnings, whereof 2.5 percentage 
points accrue to mandatory individual self-directed accounts, one of the system’s 
key features.
As part of the introduction of the new system, a government body - the Pre­
mium Pension Agency - was set up and assigned the responsibility of handling the 
individual investment accounts. Most adult Swedes born after 1938 were invited 
to decide how to invest the balance on their individualized pension savings ac­
bined effect might be substantial. Moreover, attitudes towards risk may well interact with other 
variables and form a non-linear relationship with socio-economic status. Such non-linearities 
have been documented by Turner and Martinez (1977) in the context of scores on the Mach V 
scale, which measures the degree of Macchiavellian personality traits. They provide evidence 
that individual scores on this personality test have differential effects on income depending on 
social stratum.
2See Palmer (2000) for a detailed exposition of the new system.
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counts, but the system only fully applied to individuals born 1954 and onwards.3 
The "Big Bang" occurred toward the end of 2000, when all participants in the 
new system had to simultaneously decide how to invest their balances. Some 68 
percent of the eligible population made an active decision. Individuals who did 
not make an active choice had their money invested in a default fund.
Participants could compose a portfolio consisting of no more than 5 funds 
from a very large menu of options comprising more than 600 different funds.4 All 
eligible Swedes were sent a catalogue in which available funds were listed with 
information on management fees and the investment strategy of each fund. For 
the approximately 400 funds that had a historical record, returns and standard 
deviation of returns for the preceding three years were also given. These funds 
were also color-coded by risk level: from red (high risk) to green (low risk). The 
circumstances under which these investment decisions were made make the ex­
periment uniquely suitable for inferring risk preferences among individuals with 
little or no financial fluency.
3.2.2 Portfolio  R isk  D ata
Our primary measure of portfolio risk, which we denote Risk 1, is the average 
risk level of the funds invested in by the individual, with the risk of each fund 
measured as the standard deviation of the rate of return over the previous three
3Only Swedes whose income exceeded SEK 36000 ($1 is roughly 6  SEK) in 1995, 36800 in 
1996, 37000 in 1997 and 37100 in 1998 were eligible for fund selection in the year 2000.
4The official justification for this policy was that individuals should be able to select a port­
folio that suited their preferences. For a criticism of this feature of the system, see Cronqvist 
and Thaler (2004) and Palme and Sunden (2004).
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years. In cases where historical returns were not available, these values were 
imputed by assigning the average value of risk for similar types of funds in the 
sample.5 This measure is similar to that employed in Save-Soderbergh (2008) and 
Palme et al. (2007), with the one notable exception that we also include twins 
whose money was invested in the default fund.6 As a robustness check, we also 
calculated a second risk measure, Risk 2, as the weighted share of high-risk funds 
in an individual’s portfolio.7
3.2.3 T he Sw edish  T w in  R egistry
The Swedish Twin Registry, the largest in the world, contains information on 
nearly all twin births in Sweden since 1886, and has been described in detail 
elsewhere (Lichtenstein et al. (2006)). Our sample includes individuals who have 
participated in at least one of the Twin Registry’s surveys. For these respondents, 
we can establish zygosity with reasonable confidence based on survey questions 
with proven reliability (Lichtenstein et al. (2006)). In practice, roughly 90 % of 
the twins in our dataset come from one of two sources. The primary source is the 
web-based survey STAGE (The Study of Twin Adults: Genes and Environment).
5 The classification of funds was made by the Premium Pension Agency. Examples of types 
are "New Markets", "IT and Communication", and "Europe Small Enterprises". Our method 
of imputing missing values has no interesting effects on the estimates we report in this paper.
6 Save Soderbergh (2008) excludes individuals with the default portfolio on the grounds that 
its investment profile was not fully known when investment decisions were made in the fall of 
the year 2000. The reason its risk profile was not known is that it was constructed to reflect 
the profile of an average investor. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that people 
had some expectation about the future level of risk in the default fund. In practice, none of 
the results reported in this paper are sensitive to this inclusion. This supports the notion that 
individuals not actively choosing a portfolio nevertheless conveyed some information about their 
risk preferences.
7 A high risk fund was defined by the Premium Pension Agency as one holding at least 75% 
equity investments.
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This survey was administered between November 2005 and March 2006 to all 
twins born in Sweden between 1959 and 1985, and it attained a response rate of 
60 %. Data on individuals born between 1938 and 1958 were obtained from SALT 
(Screening Across the Lifespan Twin study), a survey conducted by telephone in 
1998. SALT attained a response rate of 74 % (Lichtenstein et al. (2006)).8 Though 
these response rates are not alarmingly low, we acknowledge that our sample is 
not fully representative of the population of twins. Considering all complete same 
sex twin pairs born after 1938 gives a total of 7224 female pairs, of which 3346 
are monozygotic, and 6338 male pairs, of which 2747 are monozygotic.
3.3 M ethod
Our analysis uses a measure of the portfolio risks chosen by twins to estimate the 
degree to which variation is influenced by additive genetic factors (A), environ­
mental factors shared or common to the two twins in a pair (C), and unshared 
environmental (E) factors which are specific to each twin. Additive genetic effects 
are defined as the sum of the effects of individual alleles influencing a trait. Com­
mon environment effects are those environmental influences shared by both twins. 
Examples include childhood diet, schooling, parental socialization and shared peer 
influences. Unshared environmental effects include influences not shared by the 
co-twins as well as measurement and response error.
The basic idea behind a behaviour genetic decomposition is simple. MZ and
8 Additionally, a small number of individuals in our sample responded to a survey sent out in 
1973 (See, again, Lichtenstein et al, 2002). These are also included.
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DZ twins differ in their genetic relatedness. If one is willing to assume that the 
common environment does not exert greater influence in MZ twins, then a greater 
similarity between MZ twins can be taken as evidence that the trait is under 
genetic influence.
Several authors, most recently Sacerdote (forthcoming), have noted that mov­
ing from a crude comparison of correlations to a full-fledged variance decom­
position requires making strong independence and functional form assumptions. 
Therefore, our empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. We first abstain from 
imposing any structural assumptions, and simply compare the correlations of MZ 
and DZ twins using the bootstrap. Letting N mz be the number of MZ pairs with­
out missing data, we draw N mz pairs with replacement 1000 times and calculate 
the non-parametric correlation each time. We proceed analogously for DZ twins, 
and then create a 1000 by 1 vector where the DZ correlation is subtracted from 
the MZ correlation for each draw. This gives a distribution for the difference in 
correlation between the two samples. The p-value for the test of the hypothesis 
that the two correlations are equal is then easily computed by counting the num­
ber of instances where the vector of differences takes a negative value and dividing 
by ten.
We then proceed to a standard behaviour genetic variance decomposition. The 
workhorse model in the behaviour genetics literature, known as the ACE model, 
posits that additive genetic factors (A), common environmental factors (C), and 
specific environmental factors (E) account for all individual differences in the trait 
of interest. Start with the case of MZ twins. Let all variables, including the trait,
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be expressed as deviations from zero and standardize them to have unit variance. 
Consider a pair of MZ twins and suppose first that the outcome variable can be 
written as the sum of two independent influences: additive genetic effects, A, and 
environmental influences, U. We then have that,
P — aA +  uU,
and, using a superscript to denote the variables for twin 2 in a pair:
P' = a A  +  uU'.
Since for MZ twins A = A ,  the covariance (which, due to our normalization, 
is also a correlation) between the outcome variables of the two twins is given by,
P m z  = a2 +  u2COV (U, U')m z-
Now consider a DZ pair. Under the assumptions of random-assortative mating 
with respect to the trait of interest, it will be the case that CO V(A , A )  = O.5.9 
We then have that,
P d z  =  \< ?  +  u2COV(U, U')DZ.
Finally, we impose the equal environment assumption, namely that,
COV(U, U')MZ = COV(U , U')DZ.
9 A full derivation of the latter result can be found in any text on quantitative genetics, for 
instance Falconer (1996) or Mather and Jinds (1982).
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Under these, admittedly strong, assumptions it is easy to see that heritability, 
the fraction of variance explained by genetic factors, is identified as a2 = 2(pMZ — 
pDZ).In  the standard behaviour genetics framework, environmental influences are 
generally written as the sum of a common environmental component (G) and a 
non-shared environmental component (E) such that,
P  =  aA +  cC +  eE.
With this terminology, the environmental covariance component of the trait 
correlation, u2COV(U,Ur), can be written as c2, since by definition any covari­
ance must derive only from the common component. This allows us to write the 
individual variation as the sum of three components a2, c2, and e2; a2 is the share 
of variance explained by genetic differences, c2 is the share of variance explained 
by common environmental influences, and e2 the share of variance explained by 
non-shared environmental influences. There are a number of ways in which the 
parameters of this model can be estimated. We follow standard practice in using 
maximum likelihood under the assumption that the outcome variables come from 
a bivariate normal distribution.10. In particular, following directly from the above
1 0  Estimation of variance and covariances by maximum likelihood is consistent even if the 
normality assumption does not hold. However, standard errors will be biased, even though 
simulations show that small departures from normality are not too great a concern (Enders, 
2001). As a robustness check, we have also estimated the model using the estimator of DeFries 
and Fulker (1985). They propose regressing twin l ’s phenotype on: a constant, twin 2’s pheno­
type and twin 2 ’s phenotype interacted with the coefficient of genetic relatedness for the pair in 
question. DeFries and Fulker (1985) demonstrate that, under the additive genetic model, this 
produces unbiased estimates of the variance components. Kohler and Rodgers (2001) establish 
the asymptotic properties of this least square estimator with double entry. Computing standard 
errors using their method, we obtain heritability estimates that are extremely similar to those 
reported in the main body of the text.
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derivation, the likelihood is maximized under the restriction that the variance- 
covariance matrix is of the form,
a2 +  c2 +  e2 Rid2 +  c2
5
Rid2 -he2 d2 -he2 -he2
where Ri takes the value 1 if the observation is of an MZ pair, and 0.5 other­
wise. The analyses are run in MPLUS (Muthen and Muthen (2006)), a numerical 
optimizer often used in behaviour genetics.
3.4 R esults
A first diagnostic of genetic influences comes from examining the MZ and DZ 
correlations. These are reported in Table 3.1. Interestingly, there are no major 
differences between men and women in the patterns of correlations, with MZ 
correlations being consistently higher than the DZ correlations. In women the 
correlations are 0.27 and 0.16. In men, the correlations are 0.29 and 0.13. An MZ 
correlation, as we have noted, captures all determinants of financial risktaking that 
identical twins share; that is, genotype and shared environmental influences. In 
other words, the joint influence of genes and shared environment explains nearly 
30 percent of the variation portfolio risk. The correlations for our second risk 
measure, Risk 2, are very similar, which demonstrates that most variation in risk 
is driven by differences in the share of equity in the portfolio. Some summary 
statistics are reported in Table 3.2.
In the two columns of Table 3.3 we report results from the basic model, without
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£  =
age controls (Column 1) and with age controls (Column 2).11 In the top panel, 
we report results from a model where variance components are allowed to differ 
by gender. Similar patterns hold for men and women. Consider for example the 
results from Model 1. In women, heritability is estimated at 0.22 (99% Cl, 0.07- 
0.31) and in men, heritability is estimated at 0.28 (99 % Cl, 0.15-0.32). In both 
cases, most of the remaining variation comes from non-shared environment.
The lower panel reports results from a model where the restriction that vari­
ance components are the same in men and women has been imposed. Whether this 
restriction entails a significant deterioration in fit can be tested using a likelihood- 
ratio test. We can reject the hypothesis that the variance components are the same 
in men and women (A%2 =  10.14, df = 3, p < 0.05) but this is probably a conse­
quence of the large sample size rather than of economically interesting differences. 
In the pooled model, heritability is estimated at 0.26 (99 % Cl, 0.15-0.31) and 
common environment is estimated at 0.01 (99 % Cl, 0.00-0.10). The estimates 
are very similar when risk residualized on age is used as the dependent variable. 
Heritability is estimated at 0.22 in women (99 % Cl, 0.07-0.31), 0.28 in men (99 
% Cl, 0.15-0.32) and the pooled model produces a heritability estimate of 0.23 
(0.17-0.23).
11 It is common in behavior genetics studies to residualize the phenotype on age, but interpre- 
tational issues arise. For example, age is obviously confounded with cohort effects, so removing 
age-related variation might actually remove environmental variation inadvertently. Or, gene 
expression might vary with age, in which case purging the outcome variable from age-related 
variation might actually have the unintended consequence of removing genetic variation.
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3.4.1 R elationsh ip  to  Previous Findings
As noted above, previous studies have shown that there is moderate parent-child 
correlation both in attitudes toward risk (Charles and Hurst (2003), Dohmen 
et al. (2006), Hryshko et al (2007)), and in choice of asset holdings (Chiteji 
and Stafford (1999)), but a parent-child correlation in isolation cannot inform 
us about the relative importance of genetic and environmental influences. The 
magnitude of our estimates can easily be reconciled with this existing literature 
on intergenerational transmission. For instance, the parent-child correlation found 
in Dohmen et aVs (2006) representative German sample imply upper bounds 
on heritability of approximately 0.35, and the point estimates of heritability in 
Cesarini et al. (forthcoming) range from 0.14 to 0.35.12 This convergence of results 
across different methodologies is reassuring because it suggests that the findings 
are not driven by confounding factors particular to our study. Such include the 
fact that our sample is not fully representative (unlike the sample in Dohmen et 
al. (2006)), or the fact that we cannot rule out that twins have communicated 
about their choice of portfolio (unlike the experimental evidence in Cesarini et al. 
(forthcoming) where twins always participated in the same session).
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the share of individual variation that 
is explained by genes as reported above is much higher than the R 2 typically found 
in standard empirical models of financial risk-taking (Cohn et al. (1975), Palsson 
(1996), Palme et al. (2007)). In an early microdata study of portfolio choice using
12If the coefficient of genetic relatedness is 0.5, and only genes explain parent-child resem­
blance, then doubling the correlation will produce an estimate of heritability. If there are other, 
non-genetic, forces that can account for the correlation, then heritability estimated from parent 
offspring correlations will be upward biased.
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a non-representative sample, Cohn et al. (1975) obtained R2,s of approximately 
0.10 using a set of demographic and socio-economic controls, while Palsson (1996) 
report substantially lower estimates for Swedish registry based data. Perhaps most 
strikingly, our single variable A  typically explains a substantially larger fraction of 
individual variation in risk-taking for the Swedish individualized pension accounts 
than the up to 8 controls in Palme et al. (2007), R2 < 0.042, and the approxi­
mately 20 controls in Save-Soderbergh (2005), R2 < 0.112. A fairly robust finding 
is that there are differences between men and women in their average propensity 
to take financial risk (Sunden and Surette (1998), Save-Soderbergh (2008)). In 
this context it is interesting to note that these sex differences are small relative 
to the genetic differences within-sex suggested by our estimates.
3.5 R obustness and Generalizeability
To establish how sensitive our results are to variations in the underlying assump­
tions, we now turn to an examination of the numerous potential sources of bias, 
their direction, and the extent to which they might be expected to impact our 
findings.
3.5.1 R epresentativeness and G eneralizeability
In order to ascertain how representative our sample is of the population at large, 
we compare it disaggregated on zygosity and sex to the Swedish population born 
between 1938 and 1978 on a number of demographic background variables. The
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results are reported in Table 3.4.13 Respondents tend to have slightly higher 
incomes than the population average, but unlike other studies (Behrman et al. 
(1994), Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), Rouse (1999)), we do not find any eco­
nomically interesting attrition with respect to education. There is however a slight 
tendency for participants to have higher marriage rates than the population as a 
whole. Finally, STAGE and SALT respondents are also somewhat older than the 
average for the 1938-1978 cohorts.
Obviously, it is impossible to fully establish the "selectivity" of our sample. 
The propensity to respond to a survey is likely associated with a number of back­
ground characteristics which are not readily measurable but which may neverthe­
less be influencing our findings, such as general motivational factors. If people 
with certain background characteristics are overrepresented, and if heritability is 
associated with these background characteristics, then the heritability estimate 
will be biased in the direction of this association.
In addition to asking how representative our sample of twins is, it is also 
important to consider whether twins as a group differ from the population as a 
whole with respect to unobservables. Few variables have been found to differ 
between twins and non-twins (Kendler et al. (1996)) and we can think of no 
good reason why the experience of having grown up with a twin should have 
idiosyncratically affected financial decisionmaking in adult life.
1 3  As is common in twin studies, women are slightly overrrepresented (McGue and Tellegen, 
1980) in both STAGE and SALT, comprising 53 % of our sample.
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3.5.2 Equal Environm ent A ssum ption
Critics of the classical twin design cite a number of alleged failures of the equal 
environment assumption which states that shared environmental influences are 
not more important for monozygotic twins than for dizygotic twins. A number 
of objections have been raised, including that parents, on average, give MZ twins 
more similar treatment.14 It is important to emphasize that even if MZ twins 
receive more similar treatment from their parents, this does not in and of itself 
constitute a violation of the assumption; greater similarity in environment may be 
caused by the greater similarity in genotypes (Plomin et al. (2001)). In the context 
of research on personality and IQ, where the equal environment assumption has 
been tested most rigorously, the evidence is fairly convincing that any bias that 
arises from this restriction is not of first order (Bouchard (1998)).
Most importantly, for measures of personality and cognitive ability, studies 
of MZ and DZ twins who were reared apart tend to produce estimates of her- 
itability similar to those using twins reared together (Bouchard (1998)). Since 
studies of twins reared apart do not rely on the equal environments assumption, 
findings from such studies seem to validate the basic model. Also, in the relatively 
rare cases where parents miscategorize their twins as MZ instead of DZ (or the 
converse), differences in correlations of cognitive ability and personality persist 
(Bouchard and McGue (2003)).
14For further criticisms of the equal environment assumption, see Joseph (2002) and Pam et 
al., (1996), and the references therein.
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3.5 .3  R eciprocal Influences
The basic model assumes an absence of reciprocal influences between twins. If 
twins influence each other’s choices positively, their degree of similarity will be 
inflated. Moreover, if this effect is stronger in MZ twins than in DZ twins, it will 
bias upward the estimate of heritability. The STAGE and SALT datasets both 
contain information on the frequency of contact between twins. As is commonly 
found in twin studies, monozygotic twins do interact more than dizygotic twins. 
On average, MZ pairs reported 3.3 interactions per week at the time of the survey, 
whereas DZ pairs reported an average of 1.8 interactions per week.15
Running separate regressions by gender, where the dependent variable is the 
squared within-pair difference in portfolio risk, and the independent variables are 
frequency of contact and zygosity, frequency of contact is a significant predictor 
of within twin-pair squared difference in portfolio risk, for both men and women. 
The presence of a statistically significant effect does not, however, prove that 
the frequency of contact is causing increased similarity. Much research has been 
devoted to establishing the direction of causality. Lykken et al. (1990) and Posner 
et al (1996) offer some evidence suggesting that twins similar in personality tend 
to stay in contact with one another, and not the other way round.
One crude way of examining whether twins have communicated about their 
choice of funds is to ask how common it is for both twins to choose the same 
portfolio. Excluding pairs where both twins selected the default portfolio, of the
15We construct the frequency of contact variable as follows. Subjects who report seven or 
more interactions (by e-mail, telephone or letter) per week are assigned a value of 7. All other 
subjects axe assigned the number of interactions per week that they report. If we have data on 
both twins, we use the mean of the two reports.
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remaining MZ twins, 8 % choose the same portfolio as their co-twin. In DZ twins 
the corresponding figure is 3 %. To further examine the sensitivity of our results 
to this source of bias, we conduct two robustness checks, the results of which are 
reported in Table 3.5.
First, we drop all pairs in which both individuals chose the same portfolio, and 
rerun the analyses. Obviously, by discarding these observations, both MZ and DZ 
correlations will drop. Furthermore, these adjusted correlations will be downward 
biased if twins choosing identical portfolios are more similar than average with 
respect to risk-preferences. This sample restriction produces a pooled heritability 
estimate of 0.20 (99% Cl, 0.11-0.23) which, under the assumption that communi­
cation only affects choices through identical portfolios, can serve as a lower bound 
to our heritability estimate in the presence of reciprocal action.
Second, we make use of our frequency of contact variable. Specifically, we 
stratify frequency of contact into 15 groups, and for each sex and level of contact 
we then randomly drop the required number of either MZ or DZ pairs to make 
the number of MZ and DZ pairs equal. In this restricted sample, the distribution 
of frequency of contact is, by construction, virtually the same in the MZ and 
DZ groups. Rerunning the analyses on this subset of the data, the heritability 
estimate in the pooled model falls to 0.19 (99% Cl, 0.07-0.28). The finding that 
the heritability estimates only fall marginally is reassuring since it demonstrates 
that frequency of contact is not a major influence on our main result.16
Our interpretation of these results is that the twins who opted for the same
1 6  A significant drop in estimated heritability is, however, a necessary but not sufficient con­
dition for frequency of contact to be the cause of greater similarity.
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retirement fund would generally have chosen portfolios with similar levels of risk 
even without the opportunity to consult each other.
3.5 .4  M isclassification and M easurem ent Error
We use the Swedish Twin Registry’s standard algorithm to establish zygosity. The 
algorithm has been validated against DNA-based evidence, and studies show that 
misclassification is typically of the order 2-5 % (Lichtenstein et al. ( 2006)). Purely 
random assignment error would bias heritability downward, since the difference 
in genetic relatedness between pairs assigned as MZ or DZ would diminish to less 
than one half. However, misclassification is probably not random, but related 
to physical similarity (notice that the questions we use to establish zygosity axe 
solely based on assessments of physical similarity). The relevant question is then if 
physical similarity is somehow related to the similarity with respect to behaviour. 
The classical reference on this topic is Matheny et al. (1976), who administered 
two intelligence tests, two perceptual tests, one reading test, one test of speech 
articulation, and one personality inventory to twins and found that "correlations 
revealed no systematic relation between the similarity of appearance and the sim­
ilarity of behaviours for either the identical twin pairs or the same-sex fraternal 
twin pairs."17 We conclude that the bias which arises due to misclassification is 
likely small and leads to an understatement of heritability.
As in the case of misclassification, measurement errors tend bias a2 and c2
17More recently, Hettema, Neale and Kendler (1995) report no significant associations between 
physical similarity and phenotypic resemblance in four out of the five psychological disorders 
they consider (the one exception is bulimia.)
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downwards since any such error will be subsumed under the estimate of e2. In the 
simplest case where the preference is observed with a mean zero random error with 
variance cr2, it is easy to show that the estimates of a2 and c2 need to be scaled up 
by a factor of • But, whereas measurement error is easy to conceptualize in 
psychometric research as the test-retest reliability of some instrument designed to 
measure a personality trait, it is less clear in the present case where it presumably 
would involve the choice of actual portfolio risk to be related to factors other than 
risk preferences. While this is certainly likely to be the case, it is far from obvious 
how the reliability of actual observed risk-taking in the field convincingly could 
be tested.
3.6 H eritability and the Biological Basis o f Risk- 
Taking
It is important to emphasize two features of this behaviour genetic model when 
interpreting our findings. First, the model produces estimates of the proportion 
of variance explained. Thus, it does not shed any direct light on the determi­
nants of the average proclivity to take risks. This distinction is important. For 
instance, if genetic transmission in a studied population is uniform, then a trait 
that is primarily acquired through genes might actually show a low, or zero, esti­
mate of heritability. Alternatively, consider a culturally homogenous environment 
with little variation in how parents, whether consciously or not, instill certain 
beliefs and values in their children. In such an environment, it is quite possible
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that common environmental influences are important determinants of the average 
propensity to take financial risks, but that differences in common environmental 
influences are not an important source of variation. Second, the model is based 
on strong functional form and independence assumptions.
Reassuringly, our results are in line with the very voluminous and closely re­
lated behaviour genetic literature on personality and attitudes (Bouchard (1998), 
Bouchard and McGue (2003), Plomin et al. (2006)), much of which has employed 
other types of sibling relations. While not measuring risk preferences per se, sev­
eral suggested dimensions of personality are thought to be correlated with actual 
risk-taking. In a recent metastudy of parent-child resemblance in personality, 
Loehlin (2005) report average correlations of 0.13 for personality and 0.26 for at­
titudes in families with children reared by their biological parents.18 As with our 
findings, twin and adoption studies strongly suggest that the primary explana­
tion for these correlations is genetic transmission (Bouchard and McGue (2003), 
Loehlin (2005)). For instance, the correlations for personality and attitudes are 
0.04 and 0.07 respectively between adopted children and their non-biological par­
ents, but 0.13 and 0.20 between adopted children and their biological parents 
(Loehlin (2005)). Thus, seen in the context of the behaviour genetic literature 
there is nothing anomalous about the finding of moderate heritability, a low effect 
of shared environment, and a large effect of non-shared environment for finan­
18Loehlin (2005) distinguishes young children from other children. When he only considers 
young children, the association between non-biological, but rearing, parents and their children 
is stronger. This finding that is consistent with the literature documenting increasing herati- 
bility in adolescence (Bouchard and McGue 2003). Notice also that Loehlin’s parent-offspring 
correlations yield considerably lower estimates of heritability than estimates based on samples 
of twins. He suggests that the difference is accounted for by non-additivity.
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cial risk-taking. Indeed, these findings match Turkheimer’s (2000) three laws of 
behaviour genetics perfectly.19
The fact that a trait is heritable does not imply that there are genes with a di­
rect effect on the trait. However, sensation and novelty seeking are both heritable 
and presumably correlated with risk-taking, and molecular genetic studies have 
implicated a number of particular genes associated with these traits (Koopmans 
et al. (1995), Zuckerman and Kuhlman (2000), Munafo et al. (2002), Kreek et al. 
(2005), Boyer (2006)). In addition to particular genes, several studies have found 
significant relationships between risk-taking and other biological factors such as 
patterns of brain activation and testosterone levels (Kuhnen and Knutson (2005), 
Cardinal (2006), Apicella et al. (2008)). It is worth noting that hormone levels 
(Harris et al. (1998)) and brain structure (Toga and Thompson (2005)) are both 
heritable, providing some indirect support for our hypothesis.
Yet, it seems very likely that some of the genetic effects may operate through 
genome-wide influences on variables which in turn affect risk-taking. For instance, 
one early paper found that participants’ education and income levels were related 
to asset allocation decisions in mandatory private savings accounts, with less 
educated and lower income participants being less inclined to invest in equity 
securities (Poterba and Wise (1996)), although this finding is not supported by 
Palme et al. (2007). Differences in financial fluency is another candidate variable 
(Bhandari and Deaves (2007)).20.
1 9 Turkheimer’s three laws are the following. First, all human behavioral traits axe heritable. 
Second, the effect of being raised in the same family is smaller than the effect of genes. Third, a 
substantial portion of variation in complex human behavioral traits is not accounted for by the 
effects of genes and family.
2 0  See Benartzi and Thaler (2001) for some evidence suggesting that individuals apply a diver­
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have matched data on the mandatory pension investment 
decisions made in the fall 2000 to the Swedish Twin Registry in an attempt to 
estimate the genetic influence on variation in financial risk-taking. Relative to 
the experimental and survey evidence reported in Cesarini et al (forthcoming), a 
distinct advantage of our approach is that we examine risk-taking behaviour in a 
field setting with large financial incentives attached to performance. Furthermore, 
relative to Dohmen et al. (2006), a second advantage of our approach is that the 
use of twin data allows us to shed light on the relative importance of environmental 
and genetic differences as sources of variation. Our finding that approximately 
25% of variation in portfolio risk is due to genetic influences is in line with this 
previous, but small, experimental and intergenerational literature as well as the 
behaviour genetics literature in general. The explanatory power of the genetic 
effect that we find is also typically at least twice as large as the R 2s found in 
previous non-twin studies using the same data and up to as many as 20 controls. 
In short, this study is the first to use behaviour genetic techniques to document the 
heritability of risk-taking in financial markets, as well as outside the laboratory, 
and the results strongly suggest that genetic variation is an important source of 
individual heterogeneity.
In addition to exploring specific mechanisms, we can think of a number of 
avenues for further work along the lines of this study. Constructing a dataset
sification heuristic which is inconsistent with mean-variance optimizing behavior. In particular, 
individuals overinvest in asset types that are overrrepresented in the menu of funds.
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similar to ours but with adoptees instead of twins would provide more precise 
estimates of the relative importance of common environmental influences. Also, 
augmenting the twin dataset with other sibling types of varying degrees of genetic 
relatedness, and, ideally, rearing environments, would allow researchers to explore 
the possibility of non-additivity or to test the equal environment assumption (See, 
e.g., Bjorklund et al. (2005)) . If other work on attitudes and personality provides 
any guidance, we would expect that some of the genetic influences reported in this 
study are in fact non-additive.21 Regardless of what evolutionary dynamics led 
to the genetic variation that we observe for preferences in financial risk-taking22, 
the fact is that genetic differences explain a large share of individual variation in 
risk-taking. In light of these findings, we suggest that the further study of the 
biological and genetic basis of human risk-taking behaviours will lead to a more 
comprehensive theory of financial decision-making.
21 The basic ACE-model - like most behavior genetic models - assumes that genes influence the 
trait in an additive manner. That is to say, the genetic effect is simply the sum of all individual 
effects. This rules out epistasis (interaction between alleles at different loci) and dominance 
(interaction between alleles at a locus). A possible way to test for this would be to extend 
the dataset to include also sibling, parent-child, or even cousin data. The correlation between 
siblings, under an additive model, ought to be at least half the heritability obtained from a 
twin study. Were this assumption to fail, it would be diagnostic of some non-additivity being 
present in the data. This issue is explored in Loehlin (2005) in the context of the heritability of 
personality.
22Dali et al. (2004) and Penke et al. (2007) are two recent papers exploring the issue of how 
genetic variation can be maintained.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Within-pair correlations
Women p-value of diff Men p-value of diff
MZ DZ MZ DZ
Risk 1 Pearson 0.27 0.16 <0.01 0.29 0.13 <0.01
Spearman 0.28 0.16 <0.01 0.30 0.13 <0.01
#  pairs 3346 3878 2747 3591
Risk 2 Pearson 0.26 0.13 <0.01 0.24 0.11 <0.01
Spearman 0.26 0.14 <0.01 0.23 0.10 <0.01
#  pairs 3346 3878 2747 3591
Note. One sided p-values testing the equality of MZ and DZ correlations axe re­
ported.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for risk measures
Women Men Total
MZ DZ MZ DZ MZ DZ
Risk 1 19.0 18.7 19.3 19.1 19.2 18.9
S.D. (4.2) (4.4) (4.4) (4.6) (4.3) (4.5)
Risk 2 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.78
S.D. (0.34) (0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.34)
Active Choice 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.67 0.71 0.68
S.D. (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36)
#  observations 6692 7756 5494 7182 12186 14938
Note. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Active Choice is a binary variable taking the value 1  if individual made an active 
portfolio investment decision and 0  otherwise.
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Table 3.3: Results of the ACE model
Model 1 Model 2
Separate
a2 0.22** (0.07-0.31) 0.22** (0.08-0.28)
Women c2 0.04 (0.00-0.17) 0.00 (0.00-0.10)
e2 0.73** (0.68-0-78) 0.78** (0.72-0.83)
a2 0.28** (0.15-0.32) 0.24** (0.17-0.29)
M en c2 0.00 (0.00-0.08) 0.00 (0.00-0.02)
e2 0.72** (0.68-0.78) 0.76** (0.71-0.82)
ln(L) -180051.48 -121625.98
Pooled a2 0.26** (0.15-0.31) 0.23** (0.17-0.27)
c2 0.01 (0.00-0.10) 0.00 (0.00-0.04)
e2 0.73**(0.69-0.76) 0.77** (0.74-0.80)
ln(L) -180056.55 -121636.13
* 99% confidence intervals within parentheses; A is the genetic contribution; C is 
the common environment contribution; E is the unique environment contribution. Two 
stars denote statistical significance at the 1  % level, and one star denotes statistical 
significance at the 5 % level. Dependent variable is Risk 1. The top panel contains 
results from a model where separate variance components are estimated for women 
(subscript w) and men (subscript m). The lower panel reports a restricted model where 
a l  =  am, and e 2  =  e^ . All models are estimated allowing the mean and the
variance to differ by gender. Confidence intervals are constructed using the bootstrap 
with 1000 draws. Model 1  is the baseline model without age moderation. Model 2 is 
the baseline model where the risk measure has been residualized on age.
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Table 3.4: Background variables
Women Men Population
MZ DZ MZ DZ Women Men Total
Income 234 231 326 325 210 288 251
S.D. 111 108 216 293 - - -
Education (years) 12.3 11.9 12.0 11.6 12.2 11.9 12.11
S.D. 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 - - -
Marital Status 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.52 0.48 0.50
S.D. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 - - -
Age 48.7 51.8 50.1 52.8 46.6 46.5 46.6
S.D. 11.3 10.0 10.9 9.2 - - -
Note. Income is in 1000 SEK (1 USD =  6  SEK). Population mean is defined as 
the average for individuals born 1938 to 1978. Education refers to years of education. 
Marital status is a variable taking the value 1  if the individual is married. All data is for 
the year 2005 and population means were computed using data from Statistics Sweden.
I l l
Table 3.5: Robustness checks of the ACE model
Dropped Matched
Separate
a2 0.16** (0.01-0.22 0.15* (0.00-0.29)
Women c2 0.01 (0.00-0.11) 0.10 (0.00-0.23)
e2 0.83** (0.78-0.88) 0.75 (0.69-0.82)
a2 0.23** (0.13-0.28) 0.23* (0.00 -0.32)
Men c2 0.00 (0.00-0.06) 0.03 (0.00-0.17)
e2 0.77 (0.72-0.83) 0.74 (0.68-.0.82)
ln{L) -147933.61 -91029.09
Pooled a2 0.20** (0.11-0.23) 0.19** (0.07-0.28)
c2 0.00 (0.00-0.06) 0.07 (0.00-0.17)
e2 0.80** (0.78-0.84) 0.75** (0.70-0.79)
ln(L) -147937.36 -91033.66
* 99% confidence intervals within parentheses; A is the genetic contribution; C is 
the common environment contribution; E is the unique environment contribution. Two 
stars denote statistical significance at the 1  % level, and one star denotes statistical 
significance at the 5 % level. In the "Dropped" column, pairs where both twins selected 
identical portfolios are excluded. In the "Matched" column, we stratified the data by 
frequency of contact into 15 groups, and for each sex and level of contact we then 
randomly dropped the required number of either MZ or DZ pairs to make the number 
of MZ and DZ pairs equal. In this restricted sample, the distribution of frequency of 
contact is, by construction, virtually the same in the MZ and DZ groups. The top 
panel contains results from a model where separate variance components are estimated  
for women (subscript w) and men (subscript m). The lower panel reports a restricted 
model where and =  e^ . All models are estimated allowing the
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mean and the variance to differ by gender. Confidence intervals are constructed using 
the bootstrap with 1 0 0 0  draws.
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Chapter 4 
The heritability of 
entrepreneurship - men are not 
like women
4.1 Introduction
In entrepreneurship research, there is by now a rich body of evidence which 
documents a strong connection between parental self-employment and the self- 
employment of their children (de Wit and Van Winden (1989), Fairlie (1999), 
Taylor (1996), Uusitalo (2001)). Yet, the mechanism of intergenerational trans­
mission is frequently left unspecified, and is usually assumed to be environmental. 
For instance, Falter (2007) highlights that children acquire "specific skills learned 
from self-employed parents during their youth" and "market imperfections" (p. 
132), while Lentz and Laband (1990) assert that the father "passes on to his son
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valuable human capital about running a business operation; the son acquires this 
integrated, managerial human capital as a by-product of growing up" (Lentz and 
Laband (1990), p. 564). In a similar spirit, Krueger (1993) and Sorenson (2007) 
interpret the higher probability of self-employment solely in terms of information 
acquisition during childhood and other environmental variables. Another envi­
ronmental source of intergenerational transmission of owner-manager status, the 
inheritance of family firms, is analysed in Burkart et al. (2003), Bertrand and 
Schoar (2006), and Bennedsen et al. (2007)1.
In a recent string of papers, however, this environmental approach is com­
plemented by investigation and discussion of the biological basis of entrepreneur­
ial behaviour (Nicolaou et al (2008), Nicolaou and Shane (2008), White et al 
(2006)). Many behavioural traits have been shown to be under considerable ge­
netic influence (Plomin et al. (2001), and a priori, there are no reasons to expect 
the contrary for entrepreneurial behaviour. In fact in behaviour genetics, the ubiq­
uity of genetic influences on most behavioural traits has become so well established 
that it is now elevated to the status of a law (Turkheimer (2000).
Nicolaou et al (2008) examine survey data from a sample of UK twins. Their 
primary proxy variable for entrepreneurship is self-reported self-employment sta­
tus. Applying the classical twin design, which relies on comparing the within-pair 
correlations of a trait among monozygotic and dizygotic twins, they estimate the 
heritability of entrepreneurship, i.e. the share of variation which can be explained 
by genetic differences. Nicolaou et al. (2008) find that this share is moderately
1 Bennedsen (2007) examine CEOs in listed companies, who arguably should not be labelled 
self-employed even when originating in a family of owners.
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high, around 48% for their primary measure, and in a companion paper, Nico­
laou and Shane (2008) pontificate about the possible biological pathways that this 
correlation might take.
The results in Nicolaou et al. (2008) are however based on a sample including 
virtually only women (92-94%). Several authors have noted that female entre­
preneurship is structurally different from that of men in a number of ways (Du 
Rietz and Henrekson (2000), Anna et al (1999)). A major difference is that there 
are large differences in the shares of women and men who become entrepreneurs. 
Furthermore, the sectoral composition differs by sex, with female entrepreneurs 
more likely to operate in service industries such as health and catering. Finally, on 
average, the companies operated by female entrepreneurs are smaller in terms of 
revenue and number of employees (Holmquist and Sundin (2002)). These empirical 
patterns are not unique to Sweden; similar patterns have been observed in other 
countries, e.g. the US (Anna et al. (1999)). Such differences thus suggest that 
the role of genetic differences in explaining individual variation in entrepreneurial 
behaviour may well vary by sex. Not only do the mean levels of entrepreneurial 
activity differ quite dramatically by sex, with much fewer women than men being 
entrepreneurs; the average female entrepreneur is quite different than the average 
male entrepreneur.
To investigate if there are differences in heritability, I replicate the Nicolaou 
et al. (2008) study using a large sample of same-sexed Swedish twin pairs. I find 
large, but not statistically significant, differences in the heritability for men and 
for women. For women, my results are broadly consistent with those reported in
116
Nicolaou et al. (2008), with point estimates in the range 0.35 to 0.62, depending 
on how entrepreneurship is operationalised. For men, I find lower, and statistically 
insignificant, estimates of heritability, ranging from 0.00, for my main measure of 
entrepreneurship, to 0.16 for one of the alternative measures.
These results suggest that it may not be appropriate to extrapolate heritability 
estimates based on samples of women to men. At a more general level, my findings 
indicate that, at least in Sweden, differences in common environment are a much 
more important source of variation in the entrepreneurial activities of men than 
in the entrepreneurial activities of women.
In the next section, I present the model used to estimate heritability from 
data on twins reared together. In Section 4 .3 ,1 describe the data, followed by the 
results in Section 4.4, and robustness checks in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 contains 
a discussion of how to interpret these findings, and Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Theoretical framework
Heritability refers to the share of variance in a trait which can be explained by 
genetic differences in a given population. It is thus important to note that heri­
tability says nothing of the average occurrence of a trait in an environment. For 
example, the number of digits on a human hand is clearly under strong genetic 
influence, yet the share of variance explained by genetic variation is probably low, 
as virtually all people have genes coding for exactly five digits.
The standard ACE model assumes that genetic determinants are additive, so 
that there are no interaction effects neither between alleles at the same locus
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(dominance) nor at different loci (epistasis)2. Consider an indicator variable P* 
taking the value 1 if an individual is self-employed, and let P  be a normally 
distributed latent propensity to become self-employed, such that:
P* = 1, iff P ^  T,
Where T  is the threshold level of P  for becoming self-employed.
We then apply a standard behaviour genetic variance decomposition of the 
latent trait P. The workhorse model in the behaviour genetics literature, known 
as the ACE model, posits that additive genetic factors (A), common environmen­
tal factors (C), and specific environmental factors (E) account for all individual 
differences in the trait of interest. Start with the case of MZ twins.
Consider a pair of MZ twins and suppose first that the latent trait, P , can be 
written as the sum of two independent influences: additive genetic effects, A, and 
environmental influences, U. We then have that,
P  =  A  + U,
and, using a superscript to denote the variables for twin 2 in a pair,
P' =  A' +  U'.
Since for MZ twins A = A', the covariance between the traits of the two twins
2See Mather and Jinks (1982) for a careful explanation of the biological underpinnings of 
behavioural genetics models.
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is given by,
CO V(P , P ' ) m z  =  a \  +  COV(U, U') MZ.
Now consider a DZ pair. Under the assumptions of random-assortative mating 
with respect to the trait of interest, it will be the case that COV(A, A')dz =  
^COV(A, A ! ) m z - z We then have that,
COV{P,P')DZ =  +  COV{U, U')DZ.
Finally, impose the equal environment assumption, namely that,
COV{U,U') MZ  =  COV(U,U ') DZ.
Under these, admittedly strong, assumptions it is easy to see that heritability, 
the share of variance explained by genetic factors, is identified as 2(pMZ — p£>z )-4 
In the standard behaviour genetics framework, environmental influences are com­
monly written as the sum of a common environmental component and a non­
shared environmental component such that,
P  =  A +  C +  E.
With this terminology, the environmental covariance component of the pheno­
typic correlation, COV(U,Ur), can be expressed as the variance of C, <7^ , since
3 A full derivation of the latter result can be found in any text on quantitative genetics, for 
instance Falconer and Mackay (1996) or Mather and Jinks (1982).
4Dividing by the variance of P, <j2p , and solving for o \ f a 2p.
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by definition any covariance must derive only from the common component. The 
model thus implies a variance-covariance matrix of the form,
a A +  a C  +  a E  +  a C
?
R i<r\ +  a 2c  + a 2c  + o%
where Ri takes the value 1 if the observation is of an MZ pair (since MZ twins 
have identical genes), and 0.5 otherwise (since under the assumption of additivity 
and random assortative mating, the genotypic correlation in DZ twins is 0.5).
I set the variance of P  to 1, and use a robust weighted least-squares mean- 
and variance adjusted (WLSMV) estimator (Muthen and Satorra (1995), Muthen 
et al (1997))5, to estimate the variances of A, C, and E, and the value of the 
threshold, T , in units of a p. With this normalisation, o \  is our main object of 
interest, the share of variance explained by genetic factors, and o2c  is the share 
of variance explained by environmental factors common to both twins in a pair. 
Finally, o \  is the share of variance explained by non-shared environmental influ­
ences. Confidence intervals axe estimated using the bootstrap with 5000 draws 
with replacement.
4.3 D ata
My sample of twin pairs is drawn from the Swedish Twin Registry, which is the 
largest registry of its type in the world. This registry was assembled for the 
purpose of conducting epidemiological studies, and contains virtually all twins
5 See Flora and Curran (2004), for an evaluation of this and similar estimation methods.
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£  =
born in Sweden from 1926 onwards. In late 2005, a survey was conducted aimed 
at twins born in 1959-1985, the STAGE survey (The Study of Twin Adults: Genes 
and Environment). All twins in the Registry were contacted by mail and invited 
to participate in a web-based survey. To non-respondents, several reminders were 
sent out by mail and email, and the possibility of submitting answers by phone 
was offered. The final response rate was 60%, out of the 42,582 twins in the 
registry in this age group. Zygosity was determined by the Swedish Twin Registry 
by aggregating answers to a battery of questions concerning intrapair physical 
similarity in childhood. The validity of this method of determining zygosity has 
been repeatedly estimated to be 95-98% (Lichtenstein et al (2002)).6
My main measure of entrepreneurship is very similar to the one used by Nico­
laou et al (2008), who take the answer to the survey question “Are you self- 
employed” as their main measure. My primary measure of entrepreneurship is 
based on an individual’s answer to the following multiple choice question “De­
scribe your work situation by entering the option(s) which fit your current situ­
ation”. Individuals who ticked the box “Full-time managing own business” are 
coded for the purposes of this study as entrepreneurs. To analyze whether re­
sults are robust across different operationalisations of entrepreneurship, I also use 
answers to two other questions that were administered in the survey. The first 
question asks the individual about his or her main mode of employment for the 
last three years. Individuals who respond “Self-employed/Co-owner of company” 
are coded as entrepreneurs. The second question asks an individual who his or
6For a description of the STAGE survey, see Lichtenstein et al. (2006).
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her main employer was during the last three years. Individuals who answer “own 
company” are coded as entrepreneurs. To preview our results, the three measures 
yield qualitatively very similar estimates of heritability, and the polychoric cor­
relation between an individual’s answer to any two of the three questions always 
exceeds 0.91. Ideally, we would like some measure which more closely captures 
the essence of entrepreneurial behaviour, as in some of Nicolaou et aVs (2008) 
auxiliary measures, rather than merely measuring self-employment. However, it 
should be noted that the estimated heritabilities reported in Nicolaou et al (2008) 
do not vary substantially across operationalisations.
In Table 4.1, summary statistics for the three questions are reported. Ap­
proximately 5% of women and 11.5% of men are entrepreneurs under our primary 
measure. These figures are roughly consistent with the overall population share 
of self-employed individuals in 2005 among individuals aged 25-44. According to 
Statistics Sweden, the share of men who were self-employed in this cohort was 
10.1%, and the share for women was 3.6%.
Table 4.2 contains a comparison of demographic characteristics between the 
full sample - pairs where for any of the three questions regarding self-employment, 
as described above, both twins responded - and the total population aged 25-44. 
As is common in survey data, the respondents are higher than average on income, 
education, and marital status, although differences are not large. In the case of 
income, the full sample mean is approximately 10% above the population mean, 
and the average years of education is about 0.5 years longer.
STAGE contains data on 12124 individuals from complete same-sex pairs. Of
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these, 2915 individuals from 2170 pairs did not answer any of the three questions 
on self-employment, despite answering other question in STAGE. It should be 
noted that the list of response options for my primary measure (“Describe your 
work situation by entering the option(s) which fit your current situation”) is meant 
to be exhaustive, and includes response options such as "unemployed", "parental 
leave", and "disability pension".
4.4 R esults
In Table 4.3,1 present simple within-pair polychoric correlations in self-employment 
for MZ and DZ twins, by gender. MZ twins have similar correlations for men and 
women and across my two measures of self-employment, in the range 47-64%. 
DZ twins however vary substantially between men and women. Whereas for men 
correlations are roughly the same as for male MZ twins, female DZ twins tend to 
have markedly lower correlations than female MZ twins.
In Tables 4.4 and 4.5,1 report estimates of the ACE model for my two measures 
of self-employment, current and last three years, for women and men separately. 
My estimates for females are similar to those of Nicolaou and Shane (2008), who 
estimate heritability for current self-employment, their main measure, at 48%. My 
estimate for current self-employment is 35%, and for self-employment in the last 
three years 61-62%, both of which are within the 95% confidence interval reported 
by Nicolaou et al (2008).
For males, however, I find that heritability is very low, 0 % for current self- 
employment, and 0.00 and 0.16 for the measures based on the last three years.
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None of these three estimates is statistically significantly different from zero. In­
stead, common environment (C) accounts for about 30-59% of the variation in 
male self-employment, depending on measure. As is typical in behaviour genetics 
decompositions, the role of unique environment is large, both for men and for 
women, ranging from 38% to 55%.
Table 4.6 provides confidence intervals for the difference in estimated heri- 
tability between men and women in my sample. As with the confidence intervals 
of the model parameters as provided above, we estimate this using a bootstrap 
estimator with 5000 draws. Applying a two-sided test, we cannot reject the hy­
pothesis of equal heritability in men and women, at the 5% level, despite the large 
differences in estimated heritability, although for both main employer and main 
mode of employer the 2.5 percentile is close to zero.
4.5 A ssortative m ating
To assess the overall sensitivity of our results to the assumption of no assortative 
mating, we re-estimate the model assuming various nonzero parent correlations 
in latent entrepreneurial propensity. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 contain estimates based 
on parental correlations, A, of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, for men and women separately. 
In the variance-covariance matrix above, these correlations correspond to values 
of Ri for dizygotic twins of 0.55, 0.6, and 0.65, respectively. Estimated heritabili- 
ties increase with increasing degrees of assortative mating, although for all three 
measures, and for both women and men, this effect is small. The largest change 
is for the heritability of current self-employment for women, where the estimate
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increases from 0.39 to 0.47 when changing from the assumption of no assortative 
mating (A =  0) to a degree of assortativity of 0.3 (A =  0.3). The estimated 
magnitude of the difference is very large in all cases, ranging between 0.39 and 
0.59.
Table 4.9 contains confidence intervals for the difference in estimated heri­
tability between men and women under the above alternative assumptions. The 
degree of assortative mating has virtually no impact on the confidence intervals 
for the heritability differences, which again remain statistically insignificant for 
current self-employment, and only bordering to significant at the 5% level for 
main employer and mode of employer.
4.6 D iscussion
The most notable aspect of these results is the sharp contrast between finding, as 
in Nicolaou et al. (2008), moderate heritability (35% in our main specification) 
among women yet virtually no heritability among men. Although the difference in 
point estimates is not statistically significant at conventional levels, these results 
nevertheless indicate that caution must be exercised before claiming moderate 
and robust heritability in entrepreneurship. In essence, our results suggest that 
whereas genetic differences may be an important source of individual variation in 
the entrepreneurial activity of women, there is no support for this statement for 
men. This finding highlights the population-specificity of heritability estimates, 
and the importance of exercising care when extrapolating findings from one sample 
to another.
What, apart from sampling variation, might account for such sharply different 
heritability estimates? One interpretation is that our primary measure of entre­
preneurship captures different phenomena in women than it does in men. As we 
have noted, the share of women who are entrepreneurs is much lower than the 
corresponding figure for men, and attempts to characterize female entrepreneur­
ship have revealed that there are large structural differences with respect to firm 
size, sector and managerial strategies. Such differences obviously render extrapo­
lations from estimates based on a sample of women to men difficult. Our findings 
of very different heritabilities reinforce the point that male and female entrepre­
neurship differs along important dimensions and that distinct mechanisms may 
explain within group variation.
Following the work of Hisrich and Brush (1983), a number of papers have 
sought to characterize "male" and "female" entrepreneurship. The following styl­
ized facts emerge from these papers. Businesses rim by women tend to grow 
slower, have fewer employees and lower revenue (Brusch (1992), Chaganti and 
Parasuraman (1996), Rosa, Carter, and Hamilton (1996), Fischer et al. (1993)). 
To a significant extent, it is quite possible that these differences are driven by dif­
ferences in preferences and motivations for undertaking entrepreneurial activity 
(Du Rietz and Henrekson (2000)) and industry selection (Holmquist and Sundin 
(1988)). For instance, Stevenson (1986) reports that women value occupational 
flexibility more than men and that the desire to achieve a work life balance is a 
more commonly stated reason for starting a business (Carter et a l , 2003), Boden 
(1999)). Some women also pursue self-employment because it allows them to work
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at home. Welter (2001) reports evidence suggesting women are less interested in 
developing their own businesses. Female entrepreneurs are also much less likely 
to state that a desire to build a company or make money motivated the decision 
to start a business (Georgellis and Wall (2004)). Research has also shown that 
women are less likely to seek equity capital (Orser et al (2006)). Finally, Burke 
et al (2002) found that the desire to be one’s own boss had a three times greater 
effect on the probability of self-employment in men compared to in women. In­
terestingly, Burke et al (2002) also found that it was only for men that such a 
desire was significantly associated (positively) with firm value. I conclude that 
female entrepreneurship is a distinct phenomenon from that of men. There are 
fewer female entrepreneurs, and, on average, their companies differ markedly from 
the companies operated by men.
Yet, it seems plausible that there is at least some overlap in the causes of 
male and female self-employment. If so, any large differences in estimates beg 
for an explanation. The considerably higher estimates of c2 in men suggest that 
differences in family environment are a more important source of variation in self- 
employment of men. One possible explanation for this would be if family firms get 
passed on and divided among male twins more often than among female twins. 
Of course, this begs the question why correlations among monozygotic twins are 
no higher for males than for females. As I do not have data on family firms 
getting passed on, nor any information on the employment status of the previous 
generations, this is an avenue of inquiry which I will have to leave for further 
research. In this context, it deserves mentioning that although my survey data is
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based on se//-employment and own business, it is possible that some twins have 
also included businesses managed in cooperation with their co-twin. This would 
bias our estimates, unless twin-twin interaction was assumed negligible so that 
twins only formed business relationships in cases where either would have been 
self-employed even absent their co-twin.
My results shed some light on the plausibility of some of the genetic pathways 
presented by Nicolaou and Shane (2008) as potential mediators of heritability 
in entrepreneurship. Nicolaou and Shane (2008) propose three personality traits 
which have been shown both to be under genetic influence and to be associated 
with entrepreneurial behaviour: achievement motivation, extraversion, and locus 
of control7
Finkel and McGue (1997) examine about 4000 twins and other relatives and 
find no evidence for sex differences in achievement motivation. Finkel and McGue 
(1997) also provide a survey of results on such differences on various other per­
sonality measures. Although they do conclude that "there is some suggestion of 
higher heritability in women for some personality traits", this is not based on any 
of the three traits proposed by Nicolaou and Shane (2008). Eaves et al. (1998) 
examine the heritability of extraversion using on a sample of more than 12000 
pairs of twins from Australia, Finland, and USA. They find no consistent differ­
ences in the heritability of extraversion between men and women, although they 
do find that epistatic (non-additive) effects are appreciable. In an earlier study
7 Evidence on the link between these personality traits and entrepreneurial behaviour can 
be found in Rauch and Frese (2000) (locus of control), Burke et al. (2000) (extraversion), and 
Collins et al. (2004) and Stewart and Roth (2007) (acheivement motivation)
128
using Swedish data, Eaves et al. (1989) find slightly higher heritability of extra­
version for women than for men, whereas Macaskill et al. (1994) report higher 
male heritability for extraversion based on an Australian sample. In summary, 
the possibly differential heritability in entrepreneurship reported in this chapter 
is unlikely to be rationalised by sex differences in the heritability of extraversion 
or acheivement motivation. 8
Large differences between heritability in men and women, respectively, would 
indicate a complex gene-to-outcome mechanism. Finding a candidate set of genes 
is therefore likely to be even harder than for example for other complex traits 
such as risk-taking. This is in itself not surprising, given the widely differing sets 
of skills and abilities which have been associated with the typical entrepreneur. 
In this context, it deserves mentioning that high heritability for a trait does not 
guarantee that it will be possible to identify specific genes that contribute to it. For 
example, molecular genetics analysis has had more success explaining conditions 
with low estimated heritability - such as breast cancer and colon cancer - than 
it has for diseases such as multiple sclerosis and schizophrenia, with considerably 
higher estimated heritabilities (Risch (2001)).
The results in this chapter are estimated under some potentially quite restric­
tive assumptions. To what extent are these conclusions robust to relaxing these 
assumptions? First, the assumption of no non-additive genetic effects is necessary 
to identify the model when using only non-adopted twin data. In general, when 
the data contains a richer set of sibling types, the validity of this assumption
81 am not aware of any study on sex differences in the heritability of locus of control to date.
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can be verified by comparing the estimates obtained from only using non-adopted 
twins, to those were the full dataset -  and hence less restrictive assumptions -  
have been employed. Coventry and Keller (2005) survey behavioural studies on 17 
traits where this type of comparison has made and conclude that: (i) twin studies 
tend to have a small upward bias of on average roughly one sixth (in their study, 
an average of 0.39 compared to the true average of 0.33), in their estimated total 
genetic effect, and (ii) twin studies tend to underestimate the role of common 
environmental factors. As our main result is that heritability in men is vastly 
lower, and in no case statistically significantly different from zero at the 5%-level, 
than heritability in women, this would appear to be robust to the restrictiveness 
of the twin model. Our estimates, however, have large standard errors and the 
hypothesis of equal heritability among men and women could not be rejected at 
the 5% level. The findings of Keller and Coventry (2005) imply that the point 
estimates must be interpreted with further caution.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter extends work by Nicolaou et al. (2008) on the heritability of entre­
preneurship. Nicolaou et al. (2008) tested the hypothesis that entrepreneurship, 
as proxied by answers to survey questions about self-employment, is heritable and 
found support for this hypothesis in a highly selected sample of UK twins includ­
ing virtually only women. Using a much larger and more representative sample, 
I estimate heritabilities for both men and women separately. The estimated heri- 
tabilities for women are consistent with those found by Nicolaou et al. (2008), but
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for men, I find heritabilities which are substantially lower and not statistically sig­
nificantly different from zero. The difference in my sample between the estimated 
heritabilities of women and men is however not statistically significant at the 5% 
level with a two-sided test. Apart from sampling variation, I hypothesize that 
this discrepancy may be due partly to differences between women’s and men’s 
self-employment. The findings of this study reinforce the notion that caution be 
exerted when extrapolating findings between samples of men and women.
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4.8 Tables
Table 4.1: Self-employment in sample and in population
Women Men
MZ DZ MZ DZ
Current 4.4% 5.0% 11.5% 11.6%
#  obs 1902 1352 1132 764
Last 3 yrs - employer 4.1% 4.3% 6.9% 7.8%
#  obs 2394 1872 1690 1262
Last 3 yrs - mode of employment 3.1% 3.9% 5.6% 7.3%
#  obs 2636 2052 1774 1320
Last 3 yrs - either 4.2% 4.5% 7.2% 8.8%
#  obs 2636 2052 1774 1320
Statistics Sweden 3.6% 10.1%
Note: Figures for population is from 2005 for the age group 25-44
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Table 4.2: Comparison of demographic characteristics
Main Sample STAGE Population
Women Men W M W M
MZ DZ MZ DZ
Income 219 224 309 312 195 269 197 271
S.D. 115 106 182 157 113 191
Education 13.5 13.3 13.2 13.0 13.1 12.8 13.1 12.5
S.D. 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.4
Marital status 0.38 0.43 0.36 0.40 0.33 0.29 0.40 0.33
S.D. 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.45
Age 35.0 37.0 34.8 36.8 33.5 33.6 25-44 25-44
S.D. 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.4 7.7 7.7
#  obs 2638 2052 1774 1320 14113 11264 1.2M 1.2M
Notes: Main sample is total sample used for estimation on any self-employment 
measure (all same-sex pair where for any of the three questions on self-employment, 
both twins answered)
All population data axe from Statistics Sweden, and is for the age group 25-44, 
corresponding roughly to the average age of the sample
Education data is for 2007; Income and marital status are for 2005
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Table 4.3: Within-pair polychoric correlations
Women Men
MZ DZ MZ DZ
Current 0.56 0.39 0.59 0.59
#  pairs 951 676 566 382
Last 3 years:
main employer 0.64 0.22 0.47 0.38
#  pairs 1197 936 845 631
main mode of employment 0.63 0.30 0.52 0.51
#  pairs 1318 1026 887 660
134
Table 4.4: Parameter estimates from ACE model - Women
Genetic Shared env. Non-shared env.
Current 0.35 (0.00-0.68) 0.21 (0.00-0.55) 0.44 (0.29-0.64)
Last 3 years:
main employer 
main mode of empl.
0.62 (0.28-0.74) 
0.61 (0.08-0.73)
0.00 (0.00-0.28) 
0.00 (0.00-0.41)
0.38 (0.26-0.55) 
0.39 (0.26-0.59)
Notes: WLSMV (weighted least squares, mean- and variance-adjusted) using MPlus 
(Muthen and Muthen, 2007)
95% Confidence intervals using the bootstrap from 5000 draws with replacement 
No assortative mating
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Table 4.5: Parameter estimates from ACE model - Men
Genetic Shared env. Non--shared env.
Current 0.00 (0.00-0.45) 0.59 (0.18-0.68) 0.41 (0.28-0.52)
Last 3 years:
main employer 0.16 (0.00-0.55) 0.30 (0.00-0.51) 0.55 (0.40-0.72)
main mode of empl. 0.00 (0.00-0.50) 0.50 (0.08-0.62) 0.49 (0.34-0.64)
Notes: WLSMV (weighted least squares, mean- and variance-adjusted) using MPlus 
(Muthen and Muthen, 2007)
95% Confidence intervals using the bootstrap from 5000 draws with replacement
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Table 4.6: Confidence intervals of difference in heritability between men and
women
2.5% 97.5%
Current -0.28 0.67
Last 3 years:
main employer -0.05 0.71
main mode of employment -0.08 0.72
Notes: WLSMV (weighted least squares, mean- and variance-adjusted) using MPlus 
(Muthen and Muthen, 2007)
Confidence intervals using the bootstrap from 5000 draws with replacement 
No assortative mating
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Table 4.7: Parameter estimates from ACE model - Women. Alternative assump­
tions on assortative mating
Genetic Shared env. Non-shared env.
A =  0.1
Current 0.39 (0.00-0.68) 0.17 (0.00-0.55) 0.44 (0.29-0.64)
Last 3 years:
main employer 0.62 (0.31-0.73) 0.00 (0.00-0.24) 0.38 (0.26-0.55)
main mode of empl. 0.60 (0.10-0.72) 0.00 (0.00-0.40) 0.40 (0.27-0.59)
A = 0.2
Current 0.43 (0.00-0.68) 0.13 (0.00-0.55) 0.44 (0.30-0.64)
Last 3 years:
main employer 0.61 (0.34-0.73) 0.00 (0.00-0.20) 0.39 (0.27-0.55)
main mode of empl. 0.59 (0.11-0.72) 0.00 (0.00-0.38) 0.40 (0.28-0.60)
A = 0.3
Current 0.47 (0.00-0.68) 0.08 (0.00-0.55) 0.44 (0.30-0.65)
Last 3 years:
main employer 0.60 (0.38-0.72) 0.00 (0.00-0.15) 0.40 (0.28-0.56)
main mode of empl. 0.58 (0.13-0.71) 0.00 (0.00-0.36) 0.42 (0.28-0.60)
Notes: WLSMV (weighted least squares, mean- and variance-adjusted) using MPlus 
(Muthen and Muthen, 2007)
95% Confidence intervals using the bootstrap from 5000 draws with replacement
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Table 4.8: Parameter estimates from ACE model - Men. Alternative assumptions
on assortative mating
Genetic Shared env. Non-shared env.
A =  0.1
Current 0.00 (0.00-0.50) 0.59 (0.13-0.68) 0.41 (0.28-0.52)
Last 3 years:
main employer 0.18 (0.00-0.56) 0.28 (0.00-0.51) 0.55 (0.40-0.72)
main mode of empl. 0.01 (0.00-0.53) 0.50 (0.02-0.61) 0.49 (0.34-0.63)
A = 0.2
Current 0.00 (0.00-0.55) 0.59 (0.07-0.68) 0.41 (0.28-0.52)
Last 3 years:
main employer 0.20 (0.00-0.56) 0.25 (0.00-0.51) 0.55 (0.40-0.72)
main mode of empl. 0.02 (0.00-0.56) 0.49 (0.00-0.61) 0.49 (0.34-0.63)
A =  0.3
Current 0.00 (0.00-0.57) 0.59 (0.00-0.68) 0.41 (0.28-0.52)
Last 3 years:
main employer 0.22 (0.00-0.57) 0.23 (0.00-0.50) 0.55 (0.40-0.72)
main mode of empl. 0.00 (0.00-0.58) 0.51 (0.00-0.61) 0.49 (0.34-0.63)
Notes: WLSMV (weighted least squares, mean- and variance-adjusted) using MPlus 
(Muthen and Muthen, 2007)
95% Confidence intervals using the bootstrap from 5000 draws with replacement
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Table 4.9: Confidence intervals of difference in heritability between men and
women. Alternative assumptions on assortative mating
2.5% 97.5%
A =  0.1
Current -0.31 0.66
Last 3 years:
main employer -0.05 0.70
main mode of employment -0.09 0.71
A = 0.2
Current -0.32 0.66
Last 3 years:
main employer -0.04 0.70
main mode of employment -0.09 0.70
A =  0.3
Current -0.35 0.65
Last 3 years:
main employer -0.04 0.69
main mode of employment -0.11 0.69
Notes: WLSMV (weighted least squares, mean- and variance-adjusted) using MPlus 
(Muthen and Muthen, 2007)
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Conclusion
This thesis provides four separate studies concerning generally unobservable skills 
and preferences of economic agents. In the first study, monozygotic twins were 
shown to be substantially different with respect to latent "ability", in the sense 
commonly used to describe the latent skill which both correlates with schooling 
and which drives income in itself. These results were estimated under necessary 
assumptions on the interrelationship of IQ with either (i) the exogenous prefer­
ences for schooling, or (ii) the exogenous determinants of income.
In the second study, the relationship between IQ and ostensibly social behav­
iour, as expressed in the ultimatum bargaining game, was analysed. It was found 
that IQ has statistically significant explanatory power of the commonly reported 
"anomalies", i.e behaviour not.conforming to standard self-interested rationality, 
with respect to responder behaviour, but that its effect is small in magnitude. 
Admittedly, the extent to which this study shows that a failure of rationality is 
not the "culprit" hinges on how anomalous we consider this experimental situa­
tion to be. An experiment specifically designed to elicit anomalous responses may 
require truly anomalous skills on the part of the experimental subject in order to 
produce a non-anomalous outcome. In contrast, the requirements on rationality
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may be more modest when making economic decisions in the field.
In the third and fourth chapters, a moderately large genetic influence on the 
variation in risk preferences was found, but for the propensity to become self- 
employed, the imprecisely estimated genetic components differed widely between 
men and women. The study of risk preferences is can serve to increase our un­
derstanding of both heterogeneity in economic outcomes within populations, and 
aggregate economic phenomena based on the specialisation of labour. This is po­
tentially true as well for the propensity to become self-employed, although this 
latter notion is of course far less analysed from a theoretical perspective in the 
literature, and as such is much less well-defined. Both these studies rely on strong 
assumptions with regard to the functional form, and the second study suffers 
from a sample size which, although large by comparison to previous studies on 
the subject, is still too small to allow for precise statistical inference.
In the respective chapters, the implications and possible future directions of 
research based on these findings have been outlined. Hopefully, these studies 
together also inspire future study in general into the fascinating world of hetero­
geneities among economic agents at the individual level.
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